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DIVIDEND YIELD STRATEGIES IN EUROPE 1988 – 2008:  
Performance in Bull and Bear Markets 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY  
In this study I am examining the efficiency and performance of high dividend, zero dividend and 
repurchase yield investing strategies in developed European markets from 1988 to 2008. Between 
these three portfolios I am to discover the relationship between different payout strategies to 
portfolio returns. I am also studying the performance of these three strategies in bull and bear 
market.  
 
DATA 
I studied 1,880 companies from 16 European countries between 1988 and 2008. I constructed a 
Euro 750 index, which comprised of 750 largest companies in each year measured by their 
market capitalization. From the Euro 750 I formed Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios. 
 
RESULTS 
The main findings in this study are that the high dividend yield portfolio earns higher raw 
compound returns and risk-adjusted returns than market portfolio in the full time period but this 
is mainly due to the excellent performance in the first decade. The positive return margin is later 
diminished but the defensive characteristics have improved. Furthermore, prolonging the 
investing period improves the performance. High dividend yield strategy is superior in the bear 
market especially in the 1998 to 2008 time period and it has the lowest beta. Zero dividend 
strategy is inferior to the market portfolio and it is not able to outperform the market portfolio in 
the bull market periods in spite of the higher beta. Repurchase strategy is as a stand-alone risky 
but when combined with high dividend yield strategy it improves the excess return to the market 
portfolio at the cost of higher volatility and risk. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Many investors and academics have spent countless number of hours finding an investment 
strategy that could beat the market. Constant ground for a debate has been whether such 
investment strategies even exist in the efficient markets and can such strategies prevail in the long 
run. Every now and then such strategies are discovered but when scrutinized they are accused to 
be efficient due to datamining or only to work with the past data. There appear to be also trends 
in the strategies which are employed and covered in the scholarly journals and public press. In 
1980 Keim brought the small-firm effect and the January effect in the spotlight and they received 
a lot of academic attention. In 1992 Fama and French presented value investing in their paper. 
One subsection of the value investing is the high dividend yield investing strategy. In this 
strategy stocks with the highest dividend yields are selected into the portfolio. The high dividend 
yield strategy has been actively covered by the financial press partially because of the sub prime 
crisis in 2008 and the recession thereafter. This strategy has received lot of media coverage as the 
stock prices have drastically declined and investors desperately seek safe havens for their 
investment. The essential rationale for this behavior might be in the fundamentals of the high 
dividend yield companies or then it might be driven by the price-to-price feedback model, where 
investors bid up prices against each other in the similar manner as in the speculative bubbles 
(Shiller, 2003). 
 
Even though the sole idea of investing in high dividend yield stocks is not new, it was first time 
introduced as stand-alone investing strategy in Wall Street Journal in 1988 by the name ‘Dogs of 
the Dow’. This was an investing strategy where a portfolio of stocks was constructed by selecting 
ten companies with the highest dividend yield in Dow Jones Industrial Average index. 
Conclusion was that the for the 1972 – 1987 period the average return was almost 800 basis 
points higher then the DJIA index return. Even though that specific study did not meet all the 
academic standards it was later proven to be accurate in more scientific researches. 
 
Zero dividend strategy is quite the contrary to the high dividend yield strategy by definition and 
has interested at least in the same magnitude. Even though zero dividend companies are not that 
appealing in the bear market, they tend attract investors well enough during booms, because they 
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are though to hold enormous growth and future cash flow potential. As studies by Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979; 1982), Blume (1980), Elton et al. (1983) and Keim (1985, 1986) have 
suggested zero dividend and low dividend companies perform at least as well as the highest 
dividend yield companies, therefore it is interesting to study whether zero dividend strategy could 
act as the complement in bull market to the high dividend strategy is thought to perform better 
during bear market. 
 
1.1. Objectives and contribution of the study 
In this study I am examining the efficiency and performance of high dividend, zero dividend and 
repurchase yield investing strategies in developed European markets from 1988 to 2008. I am 
also studying the performance of these two strategies in bull and bear market periods. Although 
after the aforementioned study the high dividend yield strategies have been tested again in US 
stock markets and also in British and Canadian stock markets, no academic study been done with 
Europe wide data. All-European market study is fundamentally very different compared to the 
uni-market studies since taxation systems, investing cultures as well as history are very 
heterogeneous. Moreover, these heterogeneous conditions have changed and varied greatly the 21 
year time span which offers interesting grounds for the results. Furthermore, some of the 
countries in the early part of the time period were heavily regulated and had very undeveloped 
public stock markets. Also in none of the studies before, these two opposite and one 
complementary strategies have not been compared in one paper. This is interesting since some 
authors have suggested that zero and high dividend yield companies yield approximately same 
returns yet being fundamentally very different type of companies (Jagannathan et al., 2000, 
Grullon and Michaely, 2002). Another interesting aspect related to value investing and thus also 
to the high dividend yield strategy is their performance in bull and bear market. Because value 
and high dividend yield companies are usually more mature, have stable cash flows and low debt 
ratio (Grullon and Michaely, 2002), it can be assumed that this leads to better performance in 
bear market because their characteristics able them to sustain bear market conditions better than 
zero dividend companies. From this perspective including repurchasing companies into the study 
extends the examination since these companies have qualities from both high dividend and zero 
dividend companies. Furthermore, as Grullon and Michaely (2002) suggested that repurchases 
have become substitutes for dividends in U.S. and von Eije and Megginson (2008) in the 
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European Union, including stock repurchases into examination may reveal more from the 
development of the payout choice of European companies. 
 
1.2. Scope and limitations of the study 
The set up proposes also huge challenges and caveats for the results. Firstly, unlike the other 
similar studies, which have been conducted on single stock market, the presence of several very 
different countries increases the possibility of extreme values in this study. Also it is easier to 
take into account the effect of unfavorable tax treatment of dividend when only one tax system 
needs to be examined. There is a lot to adjust even with one tax system that has evolved during 
the course of 21 years, not to mention adjusting 16 different tax systems. That is why the effects 
of taxes have been neglected in this study. The same reasoning applies to the transaction costs. 
Because of these restrictions the interpretation of economical significance of the results is harder. 
The comparison of stock repurchases to dividend payment is also challenging because the amount 
of data samples of stock repurchases is rather scarce. 
 
The main findings in this study are that the high dividend yield portfolio earns higher raw 
compound returns and risk-adjusted returns than market portfolio in the full time period but this 
is mainly due to the excellent performance in the first decade. The positive return margin is later 
diminished from the first decade but in return the defensive characteristics of high dividend yield 
strategy have improved as the volatility and beta are lower than in market portfolio. Furthermore, 
prolonging the investing period improves the results compared to the market and peer portfolios. 
High dividend yield strategy is superior in the bear market especially in the 1998 to 2008 time 
period and it has the lowest beta. Zero dividend strategy is inferior to the market portfolio. It has 
higher beta but is not able to outperform the market portfolio in the bull market periods. 
Repurchase strategy is as a stand-alone risky but when combined with high dividend yield 
strategy it improves the excess return to the market portfolio at the cost of higher volatility and 
risk. 
 
The paper is organized as follows; Chapter II will represent the theories and studies that have 
influenced the study of dividend yields. In Chapter III are the hypotheses formed and justified 
which are then tested in Chapter V. In Chapter IV I will describe the data set used in the study 
 6 
and the alterations that has been done to it. Furthermore, the methods are justified and illustrated. 
In addition the equations and descriptive statistics of the data are presented. Chapter V presents 
the result for the Europe-wide study and the study of the performance in bull and bear market. In 
Chapter VI are conducted sensitivity analyses of the results, which able to validate the results to 
be robust in more general framework. Chapter VII summarizes the study and presents the 
conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review and theories 
 
In the preceding chapters more general theories are discussed. The Chapter 2.1 starts with the 
brief introduction of Miller-Modigliani theorem which was a starting point for dividend choice 
study. This lays foundation for a discussion of the more modern theories why companies pay 
dividend at all. As the traditional financial theories have still not solved the dividend puzzle, I 
examine the issue through behavioral finance, which also sheds some light on the investor 
behavior related to the investing sentiment towards high dividend companies. As the high 
dividend companies belong to a broader category of value investing, it is discussed in Chapter 2.4 
with the comparison of value and growth stocks. Thereafter I present the most important studies 
relating the overall power of dividend predicting stock returns and close this chapter with 
discussion of zero dividend companies and the bull and bear market performance of both high 
and zero dividend companies. In Chapter 2.8 the previous studies on high dividend yield 
investment strategies are presented. 
 
2.1. Why companies pay dividends? 
An interesting question is why companies are paying dividend at all? If we consider the Miller-
Modigliani theorem (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) which states that the dividends paid by the 
company do not affect the value of shares or the return to the investor. Because the higher the 
dividend the less the investor receives as capital gains, regardless of the decisions the company 
makes, assuming, that the dividend decision does not affect the company’s business decisions. As 
an example: the choice between common stock that pays dividend and one that does not, is 
similar, if we neglect taxes and transaction costs. The price of common stock that pays dividend 
is reduced on ex-dividend by the amount of the dividend paid out. The investor who receives the 
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dividend ends up in a situation where she holds the dividend and common stock worth less by the 
paid out dividend. The M&M theorem was a pioneering study on the dividend choice field, but it 
was constructed on restrictive assumptions it is not the perfect depiction of the real world 
situation. Still, the academics have not found coherent reasons for why companies pay dividends. 
This and the underlying problematic are known as dividend puzzle which is even today not 
resolved. 
 
The Miller-Modigliani paradigm has been generally approved and it has even been showed that 
when investors are considerable homogeneous, have time-additive utility functions and when 
markets are complete and perfect, dividends, if associated with positive costs, are actually 
harmful to the value of the company (Bhattacharya, 1982). This was found regardless of whether 
dividends contain information value or not. In real world this is usually not the case: investors are 
heterogeneous, their utility function is non-additive or markets are not complete. 
 
The managers in the company can be considered as insiders who hold the perfect information in 
the world of asymmetric information versus to owners. Models developed by Bhattacharya 
(1979), John and Williams (1985) and Miller and Rock (1985) suggest that managers need to 
choose and adjust the dividend levels to signal private information to investors. Managers have 
incentive to signal this information to the market when they believe that the price of the firm’s 
stock is below its intrinsic value. When managers decide on dividend level increase this signals a 
persistent improvement in the future cash flows and it is something that the competitors cannot 
follow as they do not want later encounter a dividend cut. An implication of this is that dividend 
increase has a positive effect on stock price and vice versa. The evidence on this matter is rather 
controversial as some studies find this signaling model hold in empirical studies and some of the 
studies find no relationship. 
 
The second reason close to the signaling models is the agency costs hypotheses. Easterbrook 
(1984) suggest in his study that firms pay dividends to reduce the agency costs between the 
managers and the shareholders. By paying the regular dividend this forces the managers to enter 
the markets to raise funds and then their actions and plans are scrutinized more carefully than 
funding the operations and investments with internal funds. Also if investors believe that the 
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company can utilize the retained earnings at a higher rate of return then they can, then not paying 
any dividends should increase company’s value. On the other hand, if the investors do not see 
possibilities of more efficient allocation of retained earnings, e.g. the retained earnings are used 
for empire building; should this decrease the intrinsic value of the common stock.  
 
But firms do have other vehicles to distribute retained earnings to investors than paying 
dividends, such as buying back their own shares. This is also nowadays in most countries more 
tax beneficial because usually capital gain taxes are lower than dividend taxation. But these other 
means than dividends require investors to enter the markets and sell the stocks to realize the 
earning paid out by the company. In perfect world this also associated with costs: transaction 
costs for self-made dividend, underwriting costs for tender offer etc. For other investors, such as 
pension funds and trusts this might be restricted or even forbidden, thus they prefer dividends 
over capital gains. Jagannathan et al. (2000) studied stock repurchases and dividends in U.S. 
stock market from 1985 to 1996 and found out that firms increase their stock repurchases 
disproportionately relative to dividends during booms and reduce them during recessions. 
Dividends still make up most of the payouts but repurchases contribute much to year-to-year 
variation. This is explained by the fact that dividends are paid from permanent earnings whereas 
repurchases are paid out from temporary cash flows such high non-operating cash flows. Firms 
with higher operating cash flows are more likely to increase dividends, while companies with 
high non-operating cash flows more likely increase repurchases. Opposite to Jagannathan et al. 
(2000) Grullon and Michaely (2002) find out that among U.S. firms the primary payout vehicle 
has shifted from dividends towards stock repurchases. They also found companies that either pay 
only dividends or pay both dividends and do repurchases are much bigger in size and more 
profitable than companies that do not use either or use only repurchases. These findings are also 
associated with high earnings volatility which could imply that the latter group consist younger 
companies. They also studied the market reaction to dividend cut and concluded that the reaction 
is less negative when investors perceive that the dividend cut is compensated in repurchases. 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2006) studied payout policies in U.K. from 1992 to 2004 and found 
out rather similar results as in the studies done in U.S. The firms in U.K. use in increasing 
amount stock repurchase but contrary to the findings in Grullon and Michaely (2002) have not 
outweighed the dividends as the primary payout method. As in Grullon and Michaely (2002) 
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firms that execute stock repurchases also usually pay dividends and are bigger in size and more 
profitable. Very important aspect especially when interpreting the early results is that how market 
efficiency and market liquidity affects the repurchase decisions. Brockman et al. (2008) 
concluded in their study that stock market liquidity plays significant role in repurchase and 
dividend iniations. They show that repurchases have recently become important payout vehicle in 
part of rising stock market liquidity.  Also must be noted that there exists much more similarities 
between U.S. and U.K. than with U.S. and other European countries. The legal system is similar 
common law system in both U.S. and U.K. while most other European countries have civil law 
systems. The taxation systems and tax clienteles are different in U.S. and U.K. which could 
explain the different to some extent but not thoroughly. The taxation issues are discussed in the 
next chapter. 
  
2.2. Dividend taxation issues 
In perfect world the taxation should drive the preferences of investors towards capital gains from 
dividends due to the higher taxation of dividends, but this has not been the case in real life. It has 
been said that (depending on the tax burden) one dollar in capital gains equals to $1.67 in 
dividend payment. Contrary to this general belief Gordon and Bradford (1980) found out that 
amid stocks listed in New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1926 to 1978 the market regarded 
the dollar value of dividend as a cyclical path around one for capital gains. Supporting these 
findings, that the taxation does not provide enough grounds to do draw conclusions that taxes 
dictate or should dictate dividend policy, also completely other models have been presented. 
 
Porta et al. (2000) studied dividend policies of large firms in 33 countries providing no 
conclusive evidence of different taxation would have effect on dividend policies. Instead they 
distinguished alternative agency models of dividends. In first, the dividend policy is a result of 
effective protection of shareholders, which enables the minority shareholders to extract the 
dividends from the corporate insiders. In the second model, the dividends can be viewed as a 
substitute for proper legal protection, which permits corporations to establish reputations for 
good treatment of their owners through dividend policies. Porta et al. (2000) find that companies 
in countries with proper protection of minority shareholders pay higher dividends, regardless of 
the taxation in the country. In these countries growth companies pay lower dividends than value 
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companies, which is, according to them, consistent with the idea that that legally protected are 
willing suspend their income until the investment opportunities are good. In contrary, when 
investors are legally poorly protected the take whatever dividend they can obtain, regardless of 
the upcoming and perhaps better investment opportunities. 
 
Even though the tax reasons might be the main driver for a rational marginal investor, academics 
have suggested that some investors are driven another motives than rational ones. Shefrin and 
Statman (1984) argue that some investors prefer dividend in spite of the unfavorable tax 
treatment due to self-control reason. This means that they rather receive dividends than sell the 
initial holding. Also regret avoidance (Long, 1978) might drive investor’s decision as they prefer 
obligatory dividend to capital gains because selling of stock for “a self-made dividend” before 
potential bull market. Long argue that investors are willing to accept lower after-tax returns for 
these reasons. These themes are discussed in the next chapter. 
 
2.3. Behavioral aspects 
For almost forty years ago Fama (1970) presented the efficient market hypotheses (EMH) which 
has ever since been a central proposition for finance until the recent two decades when this theory 
has been more widely challenged. The EMH states that in larger real-world financial markets, 
such as U.S. stocks and bond markets are efficient in accordance with the EMH by definition. It 
states that investors cannot consistently beat the market thus analyzing, selecting and trading 
securities being just waste of time and money. In the early years of EMH many financial studies 
found evidence supporting the theory. However, the newer studies have challenged the view of 
markets being efficient and the behavioral finance field of studies has emerged. Studies have 
shown that systematic and persistent deviations from efficiency do exist. 
 
The weak form of EMH proposes that investor cannot make excess profits based on past 
information. De Bondt and Thaler (1985) studied this statement examining two set of portfolios 
for each year from 1933. The extreme loser portfolio was constructed so that it contained the 
worst performing stocks over the past three years and the extreme winner portfolio so that it 
contained the best performing over the last three years. They found that the loser portfolio 
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outperformed the winner portfolio on average beyond the greater riskiness which investor had to 
bear for holding loser stocks. 
 
The semi-weak form of EMH has not performed any better which presumes that stock prices 
adjust to publicly available new information rapidly un in unbiased manner. It implies that 
neither fundamental nor technical analyses cannot be used to earn consistent excess profits. One 
of the most recent counterargument for the semi-weak form of EMH is the value investing which 
is based on the securities fundamentals such as book-to-market ratios. This is discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. 
 
One of the oldest theories in finance, yet rarely, mentioned in the academic journals is the price-
to-price feedback model (Shiller, 2003). It proposes that as speculative prices go up, it creates 
economical success for some investors hence attracting public attention promoting word-to-
mouth enthusiasm and heightens the expectations of the future prices. When more investors get 
involved and as the price bidding rounds revolves, it soon creates a speculative bubble. The first 
and perhaps the most famous speculative economic bubble was the Tulip mania in 1730’s. These 
feedback models could also work in reverse. As the stock prices decline as rapidly as they rise 
during the speculative bubbles investors and media start to find stocks and securities in each asset 
class that decline the least. This at first slows down the decline in price of certain stocks and as 
the major public observe that some stocks or assets decline less than the others, more investors 
get involved deviating the decline even more. At the end this can result some stocks to yield 
positive returns without any additional information or change in their outlook.  
 
The theoretical models of efficient financial markets rely on the fact that there exist the marginal 
trader that can offset action of an irrational investor which prevents mispricing and speculative 
bubbles. This means that when irrational investor buys an overpriced stock the marginal investor 
sells or short sells and when irrational investor sells underpriced stock the marginal investors 
buys it eliminating the effect of the irrational investors on the market price of the stock. From this 
theoretical point of view the marginal investors has the power the drive the stock price to its 
fundamental value. However there are many caveats in the theory. The power of the irrational 
investors might be so strong on the stock price that the rational marginal investor does not allow 
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to perform the counter buying or selling to fully offset the price effect because of the higher risk.  
The risk emerges from the limits of the arbitrage. The power of the irrational investors might be 
se strong that the marginal investors need to bear the risk of holding their position for a long time 
as the deviation from the intrinsic value lasts. In addition this requires fully functional short-
selling markets. If irrational investor is buying overpriced stock it requires for the marginal 
investor to sell the stock short. And if the mispricing is takes time the rational investor requires 
risk premium for the possibility that she has to cover the short position. And in many cases these 
limitations prevents the marginal investors to offset the irrational price movement (Shiller, 2003). 
 
2.4. Growth versus value strategies 
Behavioral finance arguments are often used when justifying the discussion and comparison 
between growth and value companies. In academic literature the firms can be classified as value 
stocks when they have characteristics such as high book-to-market (B/M), high earnings to price 
(E/P) or high cash flows to price (C/P) ratios. Many studies have shown that there is a strong 
value premium on U.S. stocks in average returns (Fama and French [1992, 1996], Lakonishok et 
al. [1994]). For these reasons Fama and French (1995) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) offer relative 
distress as an explanation for the higher average returns. Value companies have consistently low 
earnings whereas growth firms have consistently high earnings. This distress creates a value 
premium on the value companies. Lakonishok et al. (1994) also argues that the value premium in 
average returns occur when the market persistently undervalues these distressed value stocks and 
overvalues growth stocks. As these pricing errors are corrected, distressed value stocks tend 
appreciate thus having high returns and growth stocks tend to have low returns. Fama and French 
(1993, 1995, 1996) offer different explanation as they argue that the value premium is 
compensation for the risk that is not captured by the capital asset pricing model. They developed 
their Fama-French three factor model which more accurately captures the risks. 
 
Previously value stocks and growth stocks comparison has been conducted only with U.S. data. 
Fama and French (1998) studied the phenomenon with international data using in addition to the 
U.S. data also 12 major EAFE1 countries from 1975 to 1995. They find that internationally value 
                                                 
1
 Europe, Australia and the Far East 
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stocks tend to have higher returns than growth companies, regardless of the multiple (E/P, C/P or 
D/P) used. They also find the similar value premium on the emerging markets. They argue that 
since the results in that study are out-of-sample from the earlier ones done on U.S. data, return 
premium for value stocks is real.  So far some light has been shed on the dividend policy, 
dividend taxation and the behavioral finance issues and next is discussed whther the dividends 
able to predict any common stock returns. 
 
2.5. Predictive power of dividends 
The issue of whether some variables or factors can be used to forecast stock returns has been 
studied for many decades. This topic has interested many investors, analysts and academics as 
they have been trying to find a mechanism which could predict the stock prices. Furthermore, the 
matter whether dividend yields can be used to forecast stock prices has been researched for fifty 
years, starting from 1950’s when Walter (1956) questioned the relationship between dividend 
yields and common stock prices. He studied three groups of stock classes: growth stocks, 
intermediate class and creditor stocks (which could be considered to be close equivalent to value 
stocks) and the dividend policies in these classes. Even though, Walter (1956) did not try to 
establish predictions of dividend yields on common stock prices, he tried to understand the 
relationship between the dividend policy and common stock price.  
 
As in many studies on that field, the results have been mixed also when it comes to the 
relationship between dividend yield and stock prices. Only small or non-existent positive 
relationship was shown in Black and Scholes (1974), Campbell and Shiller (1988) and 
Goetzmann and Jorion (1993, 1995). Black and Scholes (1974) studied with two different time 
periods: first one was from 1947 to 1966 and the second data set of 1050 firms from 1950 to 
1970. They were unable to show in neither of the data samples any differences in dividend yield 
leading to differences in stock returns. According to the study, this meant, that they did not 
observe any ability to influence stock price with dividend policy. Black and Scholes considered 
dividend policy matters only when changing the level of dividend payment, because the market 
indicates this change as a change in future prospects. This refers to the aforementioned signaling 
theory. Cambell and Shiller (1988) studied even longer time period from 1871 to 1986 for 
aggregate U.S. stock markets. They find that a long moving average of real earnings helps to 
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forecast future real dividends. This earnings variable was proven to be a powerful predictor of the 
return on stock, especially when the return is measured over longer time period. 
 
Goetzmann and Jorion (1993) questioned the different methods that have been used in those 
studies which argue for the prediction power of the dividend yields on a common stock price. 
They used monthly NYSE data from 1927 to 1990 and different statistical methods to re-examine 
the predicting power of the dividend yields when adjusted for the different caveats in the 
statistical methods. Findings in their study were that after adjusting the methods correctly there 
cannot be observed any power of prediction of dividends on common stock prices. 
 
Goetzmann and Jorion (1995) studied the predictive power of dividends on common stock prices 
for a time long period from 1871 to 1993 with NYSE and UK data. They found mixed results 
respective to different time periods. The results indicated no predictability on pre-1926 U.S. data, 
but on the contrary, very strong predictability for post-1926 U.K. data. On the other hand the 
U.K. results are rather problematic since the coefficients were significant but had negative sign. 
They found the results to be hardly consistently explanatory, and offer survivorship as one, due to 
the long time period. 
 
On the contrary, in studies by Fama and French (1988), Hodrick (1992) and Kothari and Shanken 
(1992) found evidence supporting the positive relationship. Fama and French (1988) studied 
value-weighted and equally-weighted NYSE portfolio for different intervals from one month to 
four years. They discovered that dividend yields typically explain less than 5 % of the monthly 
and quarterly common stock returns. Yet an interesting finding was that dividend yield accounts 
often more than 25 % of the variance of two- to four-year returns. Hodrick (1992) re-analyzed 
three different methods forecasting the common stock returns with dividend yields. He tried to 
undertake the problematic in the models, when executing long term forecasts. What he found 
was, that the changes in dividend yield can forecast significant and enduring changes in expected 
common stock returns. Kothari and Shanken (1992) studied stocks listed at either NYSE or 
American Stock Exchange (AMEX) from 1927 to 1985. They examined to what extent the 
variables, which were chosen to proxy for expectation of dividends; explain the variation in 
aggregate stock returns. Their findings were that a simple model accounts for 72 % of the annual 
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return variation. Kothari and Shanken (1992) also revealed that the marginal explanatory power 
of the growth rates of industrial production is insignificant when the dividend variables are used. 
This is consistent with the idea that managers and investors have some ability to make distinction 
between lasting and temporary components of output in determining prices and dividends. They 
also carried out a cross-sectional study using portfolios formed on the basis of return performance 
in a given year, and find that almost 90 % of that variation is due to the dividend and expected 
return variables. 
 
Researchers have been unable to agree on whether the dividends can explain the future returns. 
Even if the studies have been conducted mainly on U.S. data, the time periods and methods have 
varied greatly from study to study. Moreover issue which is not exhaustively discussed here, are 
the different caveats that can be cast upon the models used in the aforementioned studies.  An 
interesting flavor to these studies has been given when not only studying the dividends 
explanatory power, but the effect on stock return performance when no dividends are paid at all.  
 
2.6. Zero-dividend companies 
Since the first studies academics have been interested in zero-dividend companies. Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy (1979; 1982), Blume (1980), Elton et al. (1983) and Keim (1985, 1986) found 
that when adding a coefficient to capture the dividend amount into a after-tax adjusted 
formulation of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the coefficient is significantly positive 
and increases both the significance and magnitude of the coefficient that captures the excess 
return of dividend yield and risk-free return. This relation implies that among firms that are 
paying dividends there is a positive linear relationship between expected returns and dividend 
yields. If zero-dividend companies are introduced into the sample as an independent factor, the 
linearity is vanished, since these companies have higher than equilibrium returns in all but the 
highest-yielding stocks, hence forming a U-shaped form of yields. 
 
Other view to this issue was presented in a study of Christie (1990) where he found that zero-
dividend companies actually earn negative excess return. He studied companies from NYSE from 
1926 to 1985 and found that the negative excess return is consistent is all size deciles and all 
months besides January. These results were significantly different from the previous studies. 
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Although, these differences might be a result from different period studied and other factors, 
Christie (1990) showed that including zero-dividend stocks into the sample results in rather a 
natural extension of the yield-return function rather than the U-shaped form, which might have 
been just a result from the recovering from the Depression. 
 
No study dug into the characteristics of the zero dividend companies. This would be an 
interesting to investigate since one might assume zero dividend companies possesing completely 
different qualities multiplewise as the high dividend yield companies. Even though dividend 
policy is founded on more issues than mere ability to pay dividends, among zero dividend 
companies this could be driven by inability to do so than just a simple choice. They might be 
dependent on the cheap external capital, which tend to dry out during bear markets. Furthermore, 
zero-dividend companies might be riskier in general since their valuation is based on the future 
prospects which always contain many uncertain variables and are sensitive to change. 
 
2.7. High dividend yield companies during bull and bear markets 
Whether beta differs during bull and bear markets has been explored by Fabozzi and Francis 
(1977) and Moon and Zumwalt (1979) both concluding that the beta values in single-index 
market model did not differ significantly. Yet, Moon and Zumwalt (1979) showed that, 
regression coefficients being correct and statistically significant, investors received a premium 
for accepting a downside risk. Similarly, investors faced negative premium for having upside 
risk.  
Intuitively, since many high dividend yield companies also qualify as value companies; having 
relatively stable cash flows, high B/M ratios, their performance during bull and bear markets has 
been particularly interesting topic to explore. Investors could interpret high dividend payments as 
a signal of lower risk, which is held at value during bear markets. Also high dividend yield can be 
considered as a buffer to the decline of stock price during the down market. The rationale in this 
is that the dividend yield provides similar floor to the stock price as does the yield on a 
convertible bond. Even though the stock prices decline the high dividend yield companies usually 
have more buffers to sustain the current dividend levels and distribute this cash flow to their 
shareholders even during the economically hard times. 
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This has been shown in Gombola and Lui (1993a) where they concluded that high dividend yield 
had positive relationship with the stock price during bear markets and negative relationship 
during bull markets for the entire sample period from 1970 to 1984. The results were consistent 
even after controlling for market risk, firm size and the January effect. In their sequent study 
(1993b) they studied in addition the dividend size and the dividend stability. Using data set 
including 1080 companies in U.S. markets from 1969 to 1984 they found out that the risk of 
stable, high dividend yield stocks could not be adequately explained by beta. They also showed 
that beta has tendency to increase for the low dividend yield stocks and on the contrary, decrease 
with the increasing dividend stability. This implies that the higher the dividend yield and the 
more stable the dividend stream the lower the beta, which makes these stocks having some of the 
same characteristics as bonds. 
 
With some of the prerequisite qualities fulfilled, dividends could be also considered to be an 
equity safe haven during bear markets. As aforementioned, dividend yield provides a floor to the 
common stock return as the yield in a convertible bond. During bull market the capital gains 
outrun the dividend yield by a wide margin e.g. average annual stock return on the S&P 500 
portfolio was 16.6 % during 1980 – 1989 where capital gains contributed for 12.6 % whereas 
dividend and reinvestments produce only 4.04 %. On the contrary the dividend yield was higher 
on the previous ten years time period from 1970-1979, where capital gains and dividends and 
reinvestments were 1.6 % and 5.14 %, respectively, (Binswanger, 1999). The higher dividend 
yield during bear market can be explained with dividend payout smoothing, where companies 
with steady cash flow and solid debt structure can manage their way better and induce money 
from investors with higher dividend yields. 
 
Even though the broad field of academic dividend related study is quite well covered, the studies 
concentrating exclusively to high dividend yield investment strategy on empirical data have not 
been very widely explored. Only four academic studies have been conducted and all of these 
have been done on single stock market and the results have been rather controversial. This might 
be because of the nature and the level of the market efficiency in the different markets. Also the 
results might be sensitive to different time periods in which the studies have been done. 
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2.8. Past studies on high dividend yield investing strategies 
First study conducted outside U.S. stock market study was done in the UK stock market where 
Filbeck and Visscher (1997) studied the efficiency of the high dividend yield strategy in FTSE-
100 in the period from March 1984 to February 1994. They constructed their Top Ten Portfolio 
from ten highest dividend yielding companies out of the one hundred companies included in the 
FTSE-100 and compared the raw as well as the risk-adjusted returns. Their findings were that 
Top Ten Portfolio did not perform worse than the market but it did not offer better returns than 
the market either. The dividend yield strategy beat the FTSE-100 index only on four year out of 
ten which hardly counts as a consistent outperformance of the market portfolio. The Top Ten 
portfolio failed to beat market in the longer investing periods as well. They explained their 
differing results from the previous studies on the different composition of the benchmark index as 
the previous studies had been made on DJIA data. Due to smaller size of DJIA index it did not 
cover all the industries, which the larger FTSE-100 did. Moreover, FTSE-100 is value-weighted2 
index whereas DJIA is price-weighted3, and according to the trading strategy high dividend yield 
stocks tend to be underpriced thus they have small effect on the index value. 
 
Second study was done again on U.S. data with a longer time period than before. McQueen et al. 
(1997) re-examined the dividend yield strategy with DJIA data for a long time period ranging 
from 1946 to 1995. They constructed their Dow-10 portfolio of the ten highest dividend yield 
companies out of the 30 companies included every year in the DJIA. They found out that the high 
dividend yield strategy has statistically significantly higher average annual returns. This outcome 
was yet results of superb performance of the Dow-10 portfolio in few subperiods and they were 
unable to show that this was not occurring by chance. Their contribution to the previous studies 
was to study whether the average annual return difference is economically significant after 
adjusting it to high dividend portfolio’s higher risk, higher transaction costs and unfavorable tax 
treatment. Their adjustments, except for the risk, were based on some aggregated assumptions. 
                                                 
2
 A value-weighted index is a stock market index where each stock makes up a proportion of the index in proportion 
to its value of its outstanding equity. 
 
3
 A price-weighted index is a stock market index where each stock makes up a proportion of the index according to 
its quoted price. Thus a stock trading at $50 will be making five time more of the total index compared to a stock 
trading at $10. 
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They stated that after the adjustments for risk, transaction costs and taxes the difference was not 
economically significant.  
 
Because of the interesting results of the high dividend yield strategy in the U.S. stock market 
Filbeck and Visscher (2003) performed a study in the Canadian stock market, on which they 
constructed the Top 10 portfolio of high dividend yield companies out of the Toronto 35 Index. 
Their findings were that for the first 10 years from 1987 to 1997 of the index existence the Top 
10 portfolio outperformed the benchmark index. The Top 10 portfolio’s compounded return was 
sufficient to compensate for the taxes and the higher transaction costs. They also found that the 
Top 10 portfolio was better even when adjusted for the risk. Filbeck and Visscher (2003) also 
repeated the strategy on a larger Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index and found results consistent 
with the smaller Toronto 35 index. They showed in addition that the high dividend yield strategy 
was even more efficient when the investing horizon was prolonged from one year into four years. 
And the performance was even better when the high dividend yield companies were selected out 
of the larger TSE300 index and held for longer period. 
 
Until now the most recent study is by Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) who repeated the Filbeck and 
Visscher (1997) study in the British stock markets. Unlike Filbeck and Visscher (1997) 
Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) concluded that the dividend yield strategy was able to beat the 
benchmark index in the entire period from 1994 to 2007. Moreover, the difference was 
significant both statistically and economically when adjusting for the taxes, transaction costs and 
risk. They also underlined the importance of the investing horizon, as the high dividend yield 
portfolios proved to be a profitable investment in the longer run while its return fluctuated more 
in the shorter periods. The better performance in the longer investment periods might be justified 
as the excess return of the high dividend portfolio is due to undervaluation of the value 
companies, and it might take more time to materialize than 12 months. 
 
The past studies have suggested that it might or it might not be possible to beat the market with 
this strategy, then what could this study do differently? The previous studies have been 
concentrating on a single market such as U.S., Canada or U.K., which are liquid, large in market 
capitalization and considered to be highly efficient. I am expanding the field of study by 
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introducing 16 different stock markets in a one study. This set of countries also include some less 
liquid, smaller in total market capitalization, and more regulated markets, which could allow, due 
to market inefficiency, such market strategies to work in practice. Also the time period offers 
some interesting features. It contains two major booms (IT bubble, pre-subprime crisis) and the 
two major market crashes followed by those. Also some of the countries, especially Nordic 
countries, have gone through major deregulation of their financial systems. As explained in the 
introduction I examine the zero dividend and repurchasing portfolio along the high dividend 
portfolio. Furthermore, high and zero dividend yield and repurchasing companies posses some 
interesting qualities, which could justify their different performance during bull market and bear 
market, making an interesting topic to examine how the performance connects to different market 
conditions. 
 
3. Hypotheses and research question 
 
Several studies (e.g. Trojanowski & Renneboog, 2006) have shown that companies paying out 
excess capital to shareholders are usually larger, more profitable, less levered and growing more 
slowly. Previous studies have shown controversial yet supportive results (Filbeck and Visscher 
(2003), Brzeszczynski et al. (2008)) on whether high dividend yield strategies have beaten the 
market, although they all have been conducted on single market. Furthermore, the general 
performance of value strategies motivates to study this specific sub area. Concentrating on the 
risk-adjusted measures is motivated by the assumption that high dividend yield companies are 
more defensive and have less earnings and return volatility, which improves their return 
especially when it is adjusted for the risk. Moreover, in previous studies has been showed that the 
results are not insensitive to time period so that the results may have developed and changed. The 
unique characteristics and heterogeneity in European market proposes grounds for my first 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: Portfolio of companies with high dividend-to-price ratio earns higher risk-adjusted 
returns than market portfolio. 
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As aforementioned, the special characteristics of high payout firms provide them to have better 
means to cope during economic hardships than companies with opposite qualities. High dividend 
yield companies also benefit from the increased demand during bear market created partially by 
price-to-price feedback model, which was introduced in Chapter 2.3.  Blume (1980) showed that 
high dividend yield companies outperform low dividend yield companies during bear market. 
Gombola and Liu (1993) confirmed these findings and noticed in addition a downward shift in 
betas during bear market. The second hypothesis can be stated as: 
 
H2: High dividend yield companies have lower betas and higher returns in bear market. 
 
It should be noted here that in this study I do not take into account whether the zero dividend 
policy in a company is a payout choice so that they use other payout vehicles, such as share 
repurchases, to distribute cash to shareholder or is it just because the companies are unable to pay 
dividends. Even though it is not as intuitively clear, whether companies with zero dividend policy 
should hold the opposite characteristics being smaller, less profitable, more leveraged and 
growing faster, I yet hypothesize that these companies are riskier in respect to higher beta and 
thus benefiting from the economic upswing and thus outperform the market portfolio during bull 
market. Blume (1980) found that betas are higher on companies that do not pay or pay low 
dividends. I hypothesize that that the higher returns in low dividend companies which manifests 
in the U-shaped relationship between dividend yields and stock returns reported in earlier studies 
by Blume (1980) and Keim (1985) is due to better performance during bull market. Hence my 
third hypothesis is: 
 
H3: Zero dividend yield companies have higher betas and higher returns in bull market. 
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4. Data and methods 
 
In this chapter I present the data and methods used in this study and modification that was done 
to it. The definitions and risk-adjusted measures are presented in Chapter 4.2. I introduce the four 
portfolios that I compare and study. I also provide the descriptive statistics of the data which 
includes country and sector decomposition of the four portfolios. The descriptive statistics is 
interesting as it shows the heterogeneity and development in European market. The dividend 
yields and portfolios constituents are examined in the preceding chapter. 
 
4.1. Data description 
I use monthly data of companies that are or ever have been listed on stocks exchanges from 
January 1988 to December 2008 from Thomson DataStream. The data is comprised of 16 
countries including all the initial Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and in addition UK, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Denmark. The countries in the study were selected so that 
they would provide the thorough representation of the current developed European stock markets. 
 
The full data sample comprised of 12,977 companies from the 16 aforementioned countries. 
From the full sample I will construct a market portfolio (“Euro 750”), which is set up so that for 
every year the 750 largest companies measured by their market capitalization in the beginning of 
the year are included in the index. From the 12,977 companies there were 1,886 companies which 
in included in the Euro 750 at least in one year in the 21 year time period. The Euro 750 is 
balanced annually 1st of January. The index construction was done as described to reduce the 
small-firm effect, because even though small firms might have high dividend yields and high 
returns, they might not provide enough liquidity to actually allow proper investing strategies. 
Otherwise the distinction between high dividend yield and small-firm effect would be 
unambiguous.  
 
From the Euro 750 were selected 25 companies which made up the Top Portfolio (“Top 25”) and 
were characterized by the highest dividend yield at the time of rebalancing. The dividend yield 
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measure was calculated as the rolling 12 previous month’s average. This reduces the effect of 
distorting fluctuation in dividends and the effect of drastic stock price movement onto the 
dividend yield. The annual balancing of the portfolio was done every year on 1st of April. The 
annual rebalancing date was selected to be 1st of April because it would then be free of January 
effect and as it is the first quartile start after 1st of January. 
 
To provide more complete study, I also studied investing strategy where capital was placed in 
companies that did not pay any dividends at all. This portfolio was called Zero portfolio. Every 
year on 1st of April from the Euro 750 portfolio the companies that had not paid any dividends in 
the previous 12 months were selected into the Zero portfolio. The number of companies included 
every year varied from 29 to 62 companies. This proposes a small caveat to the comparison of the 
Euro 750 and Top 25 portfolios, but cannot be considered to entirely invalidate the results, 
especially when the returns were adjusted for the risk. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2 the companies can use either dividends or stock repurchases to 
distribute cash to shareholders. The stock repurchase data was acquired from Securities Database 
Company for all the companies it was available. Out 1880 companies in the total Euro 750 
sample 1657 were found on SDC. I looked for M&A actions that were categorized as stock 
repurchases. The total number of repurchase announcement was 700. The number included 
intended, withdrawn i.e. repurchase announcements which did not end up in distributing capital 
to shareholders therefore they were removed from the sample leaving 200 completed repurchases. 
The repurchase yield was calculated as a fraction of all the repurchase carried out in a year to the 
market capitalization in the end of that year. That yield was then used in the following year 
otherwise it would have caused hindsight bias. The Repo portfolio is balanced every year on 1st 
of April from the Euro 750 portfolio. All of these four portfolios are discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter. 
 
The return measure is the total return index from Thomson DataStream which calculates the 
monthly return dividends reinvested. This was considered to give better depict as company value 
should be at least to some extent be indifferent of the dividend policy. And otherwise each 
dividend paid out would cause the company value at least theoretically, to drop by the equal 
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amount on ex-dividend day, which would bias the results towards capital gains as they stay to 
increase the value of the company whereas paid-out dividends do not. 
 
All the returns and currencies are converted into U.S. dollars and hence the U.S. Treasury 3 
months T-bill return is used as the risk free return. The monthly risk free return is calculated by 
taking the twelfth root of the quantity one plus the 90-day U.S. Treasury bill return each month. 
The currency conversion is necessary to make the returns from different countries measurable 
and comparable against each other. The U.S. dollar is obvious choice since all the currencies 
have (at least a computational) quote against U.S. dollar for the whole 21 years period. Moreover, 
this solves the problem of the risk-free rate definitions for the different countries, because the 
U.S. Treasury T-bill can be used as a risk-free rate, instead of having currency-specific risk-free 
rates for all the currencies. 
 
To study the bull and bear market performance the results are broke down into the individual bull 
market and bear market months and examined again from that perspective. I also will perform 
different sensitivity analyses to the data. As the small-firm effect and the January effects are 
controlled by the selection and modification of the data, yet other measures need to be done. To 
test the other measures I construct and repeat the comparison with longer investing periods where 
$1,000 was invested in each of the stock and held for a three, ten or 21-year period. Secondly, I 
study the high dividend yield portfolio with alternative number of companies included in the high 
dividend yield portfolio i.e. when 50 or 75 highest dividend yield companies were selected. 
Thirdly, I study alternative definitions for the selections criteria into the high dividend yield 
portfolio. The last sensitivity test is to examine the different portfolio rebalancing dates when the 
$1,000 was invested in January, July or October. 
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Euro 750 representativeness 
 
Out of the 12,977 companies with the adequate information on their common stocks and that are 
or ever have been listed on the stock exchanges in the 16 countries, only 750 of the biggest 
measured by their market capitalization were selected into the index. This meant a huge numeral 
reduction of the companies. Yet, most of the eliminated companies were small and illiquid, 
meaning that the total representativeness of the Euro 750 remained high. The average coverage of 
the total market from 1988 to 2008 was 88.8% with the low and high values of 84.2% and 92.5%, 
respectively. 
 
Even though decreasing the total market representativeness by dropping the smallest companies 
out of the sample, pursues this a few points. Firstly, some of the smallest companies are so small 
by their market capitalization that trading with their stock would be impossible for the 
institutional and wealthier investors, because even a small proportion to be allocated in a larger 
stock portfolio leads to buying the whole company. Similarly, the small companies might be also 
very illiquid. So that buying or selling the intended block of shares is not even possible because 
there are not enough market operators to perform the counter operation, which does not provide 
fairly executable ground for a proper investing strategy. Thirdly, including only the biggest 
companies removes the small-firm effect from the results. 
 
 
Figure 1. The representativeness of the Euro 750 index as of 
percentage coverage to the all-data sample 
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4.2. Definitions 
 
In this section I present the measures that I will use in the study. I will use these methods in order 
have the correct risk-adjusted return as the portfolios are very different by definition and this type 
of portfolio study is very sensitive to the set-up. 
 
Sharpe Ratio 
 
Although comparison of the raw return data gives some information about the performance of the 
portfolio, it doesn’t give any information about the level of risk contained in the portfolios. The 
Sharpe ratio emerged with the Capital Asset Pricing model in 1966 to allow better comparison of 
returns between portfolio managers of similar style. The Sharpe ratio gives the excess return 
obtained per the unit of total risk to bear: 
 
 12
1
1 ×=
ds
dS         (1) 
where: 
d1 = mean monthly difference between the portfolio, or market, return and the risk free 
return (T-bill in this case) calculated over 12 months, 36 months, 120 months or 252 
months. 
1ds = the standard deviation of the samples monthly return differences. 
 
The standard deviation captures the total risk, as opposed to systematic or market risk. Thus, the 
Sharpe ratio gives the better measure of the portfolio performance when the investor is not well-
diversified and is hence exposed to some level on idiosyncratic risk. 
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Jensen’s alpha 
 
Jensen’s alpha is the average return on the portfolio over and above that predicted by the CAPM, 
when portfolio’s beta and the market return are known. Jensen’s alpha gives the excess return 
when the portfolio is adjusted for the excess risk: 
 
 ))(( fMiMfij RRRR −×+−= βα      (2) 
where: 
Ri   = mean return of the portfolio 
Rf   = mean return of the risk-free asset 
βiM  = beta of the portfolio 
Rm  = mean return of the market portfolio 
 
Treynor ratio 
 
Treynor (1966) developed his measure evaluating the mutual fund manager’s performance at the 
same time with the CAPM and Sharpe ratio. Treynor ratio uses systematic risk, which is 
measured by beta, instead of total risk when calculating the risk-adjusted returns. Thus Treynor 
ratio gives better measurement of risk-adjusted return when the investor is well-diversified and is 
not exposed to idiosyncratic risk. Treynor ratio adjusts the excess of portfolio to have same risk 
as the market portfolio: 
 
β
1dT =         (3) 
where: 
d1 = mean monthly difference between the portfolio, or market, return and the risk free 
return (T-bill in this case) calculated over 12 months, 36 months, 120 months or 252 
months. 
β = portfolio beta, or market beta (= 1.0) 
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3.4. Market beta 
 
The beta coefficient measures the extent to which returns of the security and the market move 
along. Beta coefficient is calculated as a relation of covariance of the security and the market to 
the standard deviation of the market: 
 
2
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β =        (4) 
where: 
  ri     = return of a security 
  rM  = return of the market portfolio 
 
2
Mσ  = standard deviation of the market portfolio 
 
Student t-test 
 
The student t-test was done to test a paired difference with n -1 degrees of freedom. This test is 
used when there is only one sample (in this case it is the total market portfolio) that has been 
paired with its subsample (in this case it is the Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios). 
 n
s
d
t
d
×=         (5) 
where 
 d   =  the mean difference between the market and portfolio return in each month 
 s    =  the standard deviation of the difference between the returns in each month, and 
 n    =  equals the number of months (12, 36, 120 and 252). 
 
Dividend yield 
 
The dividend yield expresses the dividend per share as a percentage of the share price. The 
underlying dividend intended to represent the anticipated payment over the following 12 months 
and for that reason may be calculated on a rolling 12-month basis, or as the "indicated" annual 
amount, or it may be a forecast. It excludes special and once-off dividends.  
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Dividend yield is calculated on gross dividends (including tax credits) where available except for 
Germany where the dividend yield excludes the tax credit, which is applicable for domestic 
investors only. 
 
4.3. Methods 
As explained above, I construct the Top 25 of the 25 highest dividend yielding companies every 
year and the Zero portfolio from the companies that have not paid any dividends in the past 12 
month. The Repo portfolio is formed out of companies that have executed stock repurchases in 
the previous year. Then the returns are compared with the returns of the Euro 750 benchmark 
portfolio i.e. the market portfolio. I calculate the compound annual return for Euro 750, Top 25, 
Zero and Repo and then compare the performance of the investment. Since the portfolios are very 
different, mere comparison of the raw compound returns is not adequate to obtain the robust 
results. Student’s t-test is done in order to find out whether the differences in portfolio returns 
were statistically significant and not just occurring by chance due to a normal variation. The 
returns are also compared when adjusted for the risk by calculating Sharpe ratio, Treynor ratio 
and Jensen’s Alpha for Euro 750, Top 25 and Zero benchmark index as described in Chapter 4.2. 
 
The returns were acquired by investing $1,000 in the beginning of the period into Euro 750, Top 
25, Zero and Repo after which the portfolio return was calculated for one, three, ten or 21-year 
investing periods. Moreover, because the choice of 25 companies in Top 25 is more or less 
arbitrary I repeat all the tests with 50 and 75 highest dividend yield companies included in the 
portfolio. In same manner the choice of rolling 12 month dividend yield might affect the results 
thus I repeat the tests with different definitions for the dividend yield. 
 
When studying the bull market and the bear market; the market conditions were defined 
according to three alternative definitions, which provide classifications for three different time 
dimension: short-term, intermediate term and long-term. 
 
The first definition is used by Kim and Zumwalt (1979) and Chen (1982). It provides comparison 
of up markets versus down markets to the risk-free rate in specific month. If the market return 
exceeds risk-free rate for that month, the month is categorized as an up-market month. If not, it is 
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categorized as a down-market month. Because the characterization is done separately for each 
month and it does not take into account any trends, it can be considered as a short-term definition 
of market movements. 
 
The second definition is used by Cohen, Zinbarg and Zeikel (1973). It defines bull and bear 
markets more comprehensively and captures the intermediate term trends in market movements. 
This definition divides the months into bull and bear months depending on the market trends in 
the surrounding months. Most months are categorized as bull market month, but an up-market 
month during contiguous down-market months would be defined as bear market month (Fabozzi 
and Francis, 1977). Since bull market and bear market periods can last for several months, this 
can be defined as an intermediate term measure of the market movement. 
 
The third definition is used by Weisenberg (1984) and Lockwood and McInish (1990). In this 
definition a bull market month period starts when the market has moved 10 % from its previous 
low position. Similarly, a bear market month and period is defined when 10 % decline has been 
observed from the previous markets’ high position. Because a 10 % change may take over a year 
to materialize, can this definition be considered as a long-term measure of market movement 
(Gombola and Liu, 1993). 
 
Index description Euro 750 
 
The fact that Euro 750 consists only of the biggest companies measured by their market 
capitalization affects the Figure 1. Especially during the booms the small companies inflate the 
market capitalization, which if added to the data would cause the market capitalization to pike 
and fall more drastically during 2000 and during 2007. Still this did not affect the overall 
representativeness of the index as discussed in the earlier in this chapter. 
 
From the Figure 1 can be seen IT-boom and the crash from that as well as the steep economic 
boom after 2003 and the sub prime crisis, which initiated the credit crunch and world recession 
after it. At the peak of the graph in 2007 the index had 14-folded since the start in 1988. The 
graph also follows adequately well the more recognized Dow Jones STOXX and MSCI US dollar 
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nominated European indexes. This is in spite of the fact that aforementioned indexes use other, 
more complex methods to create and balance the index than just changes in market capitalization. 
These criteria are such as maintaining certain country representation and industry focus. So even 
though Euro 750 is balanced without any of above mentioned criteria, it is sufficient to act as 
developed European index portfolio. 
 
The European stock markets and financial system was very different in 1988 from the one that it 
is today. As can be observed from the Table 1 in 1988 42.4% of the companies and 46.9% of the 
total market capitalization came from the United Kingdom. The second largest markets by the 
market capitalization were Germany and France, counting 15.7% and 9.6% of the index, 
respectively. These three countries accounted for almost three quarters of the total European 
stock markets in 1988. These countries were also the most developed, liquid and efficient stocks 
markets in Europe. There were two countries, Luxembourg and Portugal, which did not have 
sufficiently large companies to be included into the index. 
 
 
Figure 2.  The market capitalization of the Euro 750 index from January 1st 1988 to December 
31st 2008 
Figure 2 shows the development of the market capitalization of companies included in the Euro 750 from 1988 to 2008.
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      Table 1. Description of the Euro 750 Index (as of 1st of April 1988 and 1st April 2008) 
 
Country
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
Austria 10 3.88 0.39 18 187.02 10.39
Belgium 24 22.29 0.93 19 259.38 13.65
Denmark 14 6.59 0.47 20 182.60 9.13
Finland 1 0.37 0.37 20 300.25 15.01
France 79 96.69 1.22 114 2 553.00 22.39
Germany 93 158.22 1.70 91 1 871.10 20.56
Ireland 9 3.81 0.42 10 87.61 8.76
Italy 60 65.92 1.10 58 914.82 15.77
Luxembourg - - - 9 86.46 9.61
Netherlands 31 81.65 2.63 39 904.37 23.19
Norway 8 4.31 0.54 17 254.03 14.94
Portugal - - - 10 99.41 9.94
Spain 31 34.11 1.10 60 1 016.23 16.94
Sweden 17 15.68 0.92 31 398.28 12.85
Switzerland 55 43.02 0.78 61 1 069.66 17.54
United Kingdom 318 473.62 1.49 173 3 208.72 18.55
Sum 750 1 010.17 - 750 13 392.96 -
Average 53.57 72.15 1.00 46.88 837.06 14.95
1988 2008
Table 1 shows the number of companies included into the Euro 750 index. It also shows the total
market capitalization in billions of U.S. dollars of each country in the index. Average company size is
in billions of U.S. dollars and is calculated as the total market capitalization divided by the number of
the companies.
  
 
In 2008 United Kingdom corresponded only of 23.07 % of the total number the companies and 
23.96 % of the total market capitalization. Also other noticeable changes has taken place. France 
has outgrown Germany measured both in the number of companies or the total market 
capitalization. Now France contributes 19.06 % of the European markets whereas Germany does 
only for 13.97 %. Also the dominance of these three countries has eroded as they only account 
for half of the total market capitalization, which is due to arise of new, now more liquid, efficient 
and larger stock markets. The total market capitalization of the developed European market has 
13-folded by 2008 before the sub prime crisis. This was also seen from the Figure 2. The average 
company size has grown even more as it is 15-fold in 2008 compare to 1988. 
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  Table 2. Euro 750 Country decomposition of the average dividend yields 
Country
Average 
dividend yield 
1988
Average 
dividend yield 
1998
Average 
dividend yield 
2008
Austria 2.10 % 1.01 % 2.59 %
Belgium 2.86 % 1.70 % 3.76 %
Denmark 1.80 % 1.33 % 1.95 %
Finland 0.96 % 2.65 % 4.55 %
France 3.83 % 2.23 % 3.13 %
Germany 2.55 % 1.62 % 2.45 %
Ireland 3.53 % 1.94 % 3.63 %
Italy 3.54 % 1.01 % 4.27 %
Luxembourg - 1.82 % 1.41 %
Netherlands 3.99 % 2.09 % 2.91 %
Norway 3.67 % 1.81 % 3.31 %
Portugal - 0.97 % 3.72 %
Spain 2.57 % 1.67 % 2.68 %
Sweden 2.35 % 2.06 % 3.70 %
Switzerland 1.88 % 1.26 % 2.08 %
United Kingdom 3.93 % 3.06 % 3.36 %
-
Average 2.83 % 1.77 % 3.09 %
Median 2.71 % 1.76 % 3.22 %
The average dividend yields were calculated on 1st of April in every year
shown in the table. The average dividend yields were calculated as a
unweighted average in a respective country. The zero-dividend companies
were also included in to the equation. Luxembourg and Portugal were not
included in the index in 1988, thus lacking the value.
 
 
This difference between the growth of total market capitalization and average company size 
could be derived to index composition. As only the biggest companies from each country are 
selected in the index it does not provide accurate depiction of the average company size in 
respective country.  
 
Table 2 provides a country decomposed outlook onto the dividend yields in different countries in 
the Euro 750 index. The Table 2 shows, that dividend yields in different countries are somewhat 
stable and no country significantly stands out from the general population. The largest dividend 
yield in 1988 was in Netherlands, where the average dividend yield was 3.99% and lowest 
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dividend yield was in Finland amounting 0.90%. In 1998 the largest dividend yield was in United 
Kingdom where it was 3.06% and lowest was in Portugal 0.97%. In 2008 the highest dividend 
yield was paid in Finland as the average dividend yield was 4.55% and the lowest dividend yield 
was acquired in Luxembourg where the average dividend yield was only 1.41%. Also when 
looking into the changes in the dividend yields between the time periods some very noticeable 
changes can be observed. For example, in Finland the average dividend yield has almost 
quadrupled from 1988 to 2008 whereas in other countries the dividend yields have grown but still 
on average only by 33%. 
 
Different issues drive the dividend policies in different countries. The general economic situation 
defines some boundaries to the amounts that can be paid out to the shareholders as dividends. If 
the economic cycle is in a favorable position in a certain country, the companies can distribute 
the excess cash to their shareholders more easily than in the times when the country is going 
through hard times. The investor behavior might also drive the companies’ preferences whether 
to distribute excess cash as dividends, stock repurchases or capital gains. Yet probably the most 
influential reason for the investor behavior and the dividend yield levels and thus to changes in 
the dividend yields is derived from the respective legislation and dividend taxation. The thorough 
discussion behind this is beyond on the scope of this study. 
 
Index description Top 25 portfolio 
 
The country decomposition of the Top 25 portfolio reveals the true heterogeneity in the Europe 
wide sample, which can be seen in Table 3. In 1988 Top 25 portfolio included companies from 
only five countries of out 16. In 2008 the Top 25 is more diversified in country-wise as is the 
Euro 750 index. Now companies from 8 countries are included in the Top 25 portfolio. In 1988 
48% of the companies in Top 25 portfolio came from France. This is quite noticeable as France 
made up only 10.5% of the Euro 750 index.  Second largest number of companies into the Top 25 
portfolio came from United Kingdom with 6 companies. When measured by the average size of 
the companies, the companies from France and United Kingdom equal pretty well with average 
size 1.07 and 1.01 billion US dollars, respectively. The small numeral size of Top 25 means that 
even in the most balanced scenario not even two companies from the same country are selected. 
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     Table 3. Description of the Top 25 Portfolio (as of 1st of April 1988 and 1st April 2008) 
Country
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
Belgium - - - 3 77.33 25.78
Denmark - - - 1 6.00 6.00
Finland - - - 1 15.84 15.84
France 12 12.83 1.07 3 97.91 32.64
Italy 4 2.49 0.62 4 80.51 20.13
Netherlands 2 4.51 2.25 - - -
Norway 1 0.37 0.37 1 3.51 3.51
Spain - - - 3 14.64 4.88
United Kingdom 6 6.04 1.01 9 158.98 17.66
Sum 25.00 26.23 - 25.00 454.72 -
Average 5.00 5.25 1.06 3.13 56.84 15.80
1988 2008
Table 3 shows the number of companies included into the Top 25 indexboth in 1988 and 2008. It also
shows the total market capitalization in billions of U.S. dollars of each country in the index. Average
company size is in billions of U.S. dollars and is calculated as the total market capitalization divided
by the number of the companies.
 
 
This could result in extreme cases and returns. Furthermore, as the overall population of 16 
different countries means 16 different investment environments and tax systems, the portfolio 
selection does not take into account any relative dividend yields across countries. This implies 
that even though a company pays twice the dividend to its stock price compared to average e.g.  
in Norway, it would not be included in the index if the dividend yield europewide is still low. 
 
If these differences within the Top 25 are examined, can be observed that only two companies 
from Netherlands made to the 1988 Top 25 portfolio but the average size of those two companies 
was almost twice the size of the average company from France and United Kingdom. In 2008 the 
number of the companies from United Kingdom had outgrown the companies from France. But 
companies from France are on average bigger when measured by their total market capitalization. 
This was greatly because Top 25 portfolio included in 2008 France Telecom which was 26th 
largest company measured by its market capitalization at the time. 
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  Table 4. Top 25 country decomposition of the average dividend yields 
Country
Average 
dividend yield 
1988
Average 
dividend yield 
1998
Average 
dividend yield 
2008
Belgium - - 7.77 %
Denmark - - 4.03 %
Finland - - 6.82 %
France 9.56 % 7.45 % 8.70 %
Italy 9.28 % - 11.62 %
Netherlands 8.21 % 6.52 % -
Norway 18.64 % 6.30 % 14.40 %
Spain - - 8.11 %
United Kingdom 8.63 % 6.35 % 8.51 %
Average 9.55 % 6.62 % 8.88 %
Median 9.28 % 6.44 % 8.31 %
The average dividend yields were calculated on 1st of April in every year
shown in the table. The average dividend yields were calculated as a
unweighted average in a respective country. The zero-dividend companies
were also included in to the equation. Luxembourg and Portugal were not
included in the index in 1988, thus lacking the value.
 
 
On average the companies in Top 25 portfolio are only slightly bigger in size. This is yet 
consistent with the idea that companies that pay bigger dividends are more mature, established 
and larger companies (e.g. Trojanowski & Renneboog. 2006). The difference is almost 6% but 
still so small that any far-reaching conclusions cannot be based on this finding. This difference 
remains quite the same and is approximately 6% also in 2008. However since the size difference 
is not any bigger, it can be argued that the results are not driven by the larger or smaller size of 
the companies, which increases the causality of pure dividend yield to the investor profits. 
 
Table 4 presents the country decomposed average dividend yields in Top 25. It provides an 
interesting comparison with the average dividend yields in Euro 750 in Table 2. In each of the 
time points the average dividend yield in Top 25 is almost three times the dividend yield in Euro 
750. The comparison shows also the extreme dividend yields such the Storebrand ASA from 
Norway which had average dividend yield amounting 18.64% even though the average dividend 
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yield in Norway was 3.67%. A Norwegian company offers extreme value again in 2008 when 
Frontline Ltd. is included as the only Norwegian company in Top 25. It has an average dividend 
yield of 14.40% while the average dividend yield in Norway in 2008 was 3.31%. 
   
The Top 25 portfolio illustrates similar curtsy in the average dividend yields in 1998 as the Euro 
750 portfolio. Yet the ratio remains at 3-to-1 in size. The moving average of dividend yields 
removes the absolute extreme values from the Top 25 and from the Euro 750. The lowest 12-
month average dividend yield in 2008 was 4.03% which is quite close to the 3.09% average 
dividend yield in Euro 750. 
 
Index description of Zero portfolio 
 
Because of its definition4 the composition in Zero portfolio varies more than in Euro 750 and in 
Top 25 portfolios e.g. Zero portfolio contained only 29 companies in 1991 and 62 companies in 
2004. Also the definition does not take into account whether company had paid only one 
dividend in the 12 month period. It is still classified as dividend-paying company. Also the 
definition does not lay any restrictions on the size of the companies. Nevertheless even the 
smallest companies in Euro 750 are rather large in overall scale. 
 
Table 5 shows that the Zero portfolio contained companies from all the other 16 countries except 
Finland, Luxembourg and Portugal in 1988. Finland and Portugal remain to be excluded from the 
Zero portfolio in 2008 as well. Altogether in 1988 Zero portfolio comprised of 42 companies. 
The largest number of companies came from France, Switzerland, United Kingdom and Germany 
with 8, 7, 7 and 6 companies, respectively. This group forms 65.12% of the total number of 
companies. When the proportion of this group’s total market capitalization is examined in 1988 
they comprise a share of 67.48% of the total market capitalization. In 2008 these four countries 
still make up the largest proportion both in numbers and in market capitalization. However, now 
they comprise only 55.10% when ranked in number of the companies and 50.04% when 
measured by their total market capitalization, which is similar as in the Euro 750. 
                                                 
4
 Every year on 1st of April from the Euro 750 portfolio the companies that did not pay any dividends in the previous 
12 months were selected into the Zero portfolio 
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     Table 5. Description of the Zero Portfolio (as of 1st of April 1988 and 1st April 2008) 
Country
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
Austria 1 0.17 0.17 1 8.11         8.11
Belgium 1 1.62 1.62 1 2.43         2.43
Denmark 1 0.06 0.06 4 31.84       7.96
France 8 8.53 1.07 5 16.67       3.33
Germany 6 3.26 0.54 6 20.33       3.39
Ireland 1 0.23 0.23 1 4.58         4.58
Italy 3 1.77 0.59 2 4.34         2.17
Luxembourg - - - 2 13.56       6.78
Netherlands 1 0.29 0.29 4 26.48       6.62
Norway 2 0.52 0.26 3 8.71         2.90
Spain 2 1.40 0.70 3 9.90         3.30
Sweden 3 4.38 1.46 1 3.25         3.25
Switzerland 7 3.13 0.45 8 40.34       5.04
United Kingdom 7 6.72 0.96 8 36.03       4.50
Sum 43.00 32.07 - 49.00 226.58 -
Average 3.31 2.47 0.65 3.50 16.18 4.60
Table 5 shows the number of companies included into the Zero portfolio both in 1988 and 2008. It
also shows the total market capitalization in billions of U.S. dollars of each country in the index.
Average company size is in billions of U.S. dollars and is calculated as the total market capitalization
divided by the number of the companies.
1988 2008
 
 
An interesting, however not surprising, observation is that the average company size is 
significantly smaller in Zero portfolio than in Top 25 or in Euro 750 portfolios. In 1988 the 
average company size in Zero portfolio was almost 40% smaller than in Top 25 portfolio and 
35% smaller than in Euro 750 portfolio. In 2008 this difference has spread even further and it is 
compared to Top 25 portfolio 71% and to Euro 750 it is 69%. This supports the idea that 
companies that do not pay any dividends are smaller in size and still growth stage in their 
business life cycle (Trojanowski & Renneboog. 2006). Moreover, this difference is much larger 
than the positive size difference between Top 25 and Euro 750. 
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Index description of Repo portfolio 
 
Since stock repurchases have increased in Europe not until 1997, it is not relevant to show 
descriptive statistics from the first decade. Also as the number of the companies varies even more 
than in Zero portfolio proper comparison to the other portfolios is challenging yet adds value to 
the study. The study by von Heje and Meggingson (2008) showed that stock repurchases have 
increased more compared dividends as payout vehicle, leaving stock repurchase out of the study 
would leave some aspects unexplored. Table 6 shows the concentration of stock repurchases to 
occur only in few countries. In 1997 altogether eight companies completed stock repurchases and 
those eight companies came from just three different countries. These results are motivated 
mainly on legislation. In some countries (e.g. Germany and France) stock repurchase have been 
illegal until recently and in other countries taxes on dividends are much higher than on capital 
gains (e.g. the Netherlands) but there exist specific tax provisions to discourage stock 
repurchases. Also in many European countries companies do not have to disclose their stock 
repurchase authorizations and they are only mentioned in the annual report if completed.  
 
Even though the small number of sample companies in Repo portfolio makes the results rather 
sensitive and one must be careful when drawing very far-reaching conclusions, it is noticeable 
that in 1997 the repurchasing companies are bigger in market value than in Euro 750, Top 25 or 
Zero portfolio. The average size of repurchasing company was almost twice the size of an 
average company in Top 25 portfolio. Even when Barclays PLC, which had market value of 25.3 
billion USD and contributed 54% of the total portfolio size, is removed from the comparison the 
average company size in Repo portfolio stays 40% higher than in Top 25. 
 
In 2008 the changes in legislation enabled companies better to utilize stock repurchases as payout 
vehicles and now the Repo portfolio held 15 companies from seven different countries. Although 
the size comparison is under same caveats as in 1997, the average company size in Repo portfolio 
is 48% higher than in Top 25, which implies that companies which repurchase their own stock 
are bigger in size than companies which pay out large dividends relative to their stock price. 
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     Table 6. Description of the Repo Portfolio (as of 1st of April 1997 and 1st April 2008) 
Country
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
No. of 
companies
Total 
market cap.
Average 
company 
size
France - - - 1 4.04 4.04
Germany - - - 1 2.43 2.43
Italy - - - 1 85.84 85.84
Luxembourg - - - 1 11.52 11.52
Netherlands 2 3.5 1.75 6 148.96 24.83
Switzerland 1 3.6 3.62 2 49.92 24.96
United Kingdom 5 39.8 7.97 3 28.83 9.61
Sum 8.00 46.96 - 15.00 331.54 -
Average 2.67 15.65 4.45 2.14 47.36 23.32
Table 6 shows the number of companies included into the Repo portfolio both in 1997 and 2008. It
also shows the total market capitalization in billions of U.S. dollars of each country in the index.
Average company size is in billions of U.S. dollars and is calculated as the total market capitalization
divided by the number of the companies. The first year is 1997 because it is the first time portfolio
contains more than four companies.
1997 2008
  
Additional index comparison 
 
The Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios differ in many other ways than just in country 
decomposition and size measured in market capitalization. Thus it is interesting to investigate the 
break-down between different industries, since it might help to explain both the results and the 
aforementioned descriptive statistics. Furthermore, the number of companies in the portfolios is 
different. Euro 750 and Top 25 have 750 and 25 companies included in the portfolio every year, 
respectively, but Zero and Repo portfolio have varying number of companies which in any case 
is remarkably lower than in the Euro 750 index.  This has direct connection to the economical 
significance of the results since the annual turnover of the companies is much smaller in the large 
Euro 750 portfolio than in the three other smaller portfolios. This is intuitively reasonable since 
the rebalancing in Euro 750 is done according to total market value of the companies which 
fluctuates less then the restriction of companies having paid high or no dividends or had executed 
stock repurchases in the past 12 months. 
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Table 7.  Index constituents’ turnover in Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and 
Repo Portfolio 
Number of years in the 
index Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
15 to 21 403 0 1 0
8 to 20 450 9 13 0
1 to 7 1027 215 396 75
Annual turnover 11.9 % 42.7 % 43.4 % 89.3 %
Av. years in the index 8.38 2.34 2.31 1.32
Table 7 shows the number of companies as they appear in the index. The
annual turnover is calculated is calculated as a relation of the average
number of the companies during the 21 year time period to the number of
companies in every single year.
  
 
The turnover on the other hand has a positive relation to the transaction costs as in the smaller 
portfolio a large proportion of the stocks must be sold and the newcomers must be bought every 
year or at the rebalancing point. 
 
As can been seen from the Table 7 the annual turnover is almost four times smaller in Euro 750 
than in Top 25 and Zero portfolios and almost nine times smaller than in Repo portfolio. 
Moreover, no company stays in the Top 25 portfolio for the full time period i.e. 21 years or even 
for 15 years. Zero portfolio has only one company, Eurotunnel S.A., which remains in the index 
for 17 years. In Euro 750 21.7% of the companies are in the index for 15 to 21 years. The average 
years that a single company is included in the portfolio are in Euro 750 8.38 years which 3.5 
times longer than the 2.34 years in Top 25 and 2.31 years in Zero portfolios. Repo portfolio is 
completely different from its peers since no companies stays in the portfolio over four years and 
even in that case the time in the portfolio is not consecutive. The annual turnover is almost the 
double to Top 25 and Zero portfolio which depicts the fluctuation and flexibility in stock 
repurchase compared to dividend policies. 
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Table 8. Sector break-down of Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo Portfolio (as of 1st of April 1988 and 1st April 
2008) 
Country Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
Basic Materials 5.9 % - 11.6 % 7.2 % - 9.3 % 13.3 %
Consumer Goods 14.3 % 12.0 % 11.6 % 10.4 % - 7.0 % 6.7 %
Consumer Services 14.0 % 12.0 % 7.0 % 12.8 % 24.0 % 16.3 % 20.0 %
Financials 26.5 % 52.0 % 25.6 % 25.9 % 40.0 % 20.9 % 26.7 %
Healthcare 2.4 % - - 4.1 % - 7.0 % -
Industrials 25.1 % - 18.6 % 19.5 % 4.0 % 18.6 % 13.3 %
Oil & Gas 3.2 % 16.0 % 14.0 % 5.9 % 8.0 % 18.6 % -
Technology 1.6 % 4.0 % 7.0 % 3.2 % - 9.3 % 6.7 %
Telecommunications 1.3 % - - 3.1 % 16.0 % 4.7 % 6.7 %
Utilities 3.5 % 4.0 % - 6.7 % 8.0 % 2.3 % 6.7 %
Unclassified 1.5 % - 4.7 % 0.7 % - 2.3 % -
Average 9.0 % 16.7 % 12.5 % 9.0 % 16.7 % 10.6 % 12.5 %
Median 3.5 % 12.0 % 11.6 % 6.7 % 12.0 % 9.3 % 10.0 %
Table 8 shows the break-down into ICB sectors in Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolio in 1st of April 
1988 and 1st of April in 2008. Repo portfolio has values only in 2008 since it had only one company in 1988.
1988 2008
 
Looking into the sector break-down of the portfolios in Table 8 reveals that the sector 
composition has remained quite stable in absolute terms at first glance. When examining more 
carefully the structural change can be observed. For example, the Consumer goods and 
Industrials sector have decreased by 27.1% and 22.3%, respectively, whereas Healthcare, Oil & 
Gas, Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities have developed and grown on average by 
95.6%. In 1988 this aforementioned group accounted for 12.0% of total sectors and in 2008 this 
was almost doubled to 22.9%. 
 
In 1988 the most of the highest dividend yields in Top 25 were in Financials sector, which 
accounted for over half of the sectors in Top 25 portfolio. Even though the weight of Financials 
sectors has decreased in 21 years, it still comprises 40.0% of the sectors in Top 25 portfolio in 
2008. Together with Consumer Services and Telecommunications rises the sector sum to 80.0%. 
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Noticeable is that this 80% provide services rather than goods. The reasons behind this are 
numerous as it might be because of the capital intensity of other sectors or that companies 
providing services had accumulated large reserves of cash that is then possible to distribute to the 
shareholders as no real investment opportunities are available. 
 
In Zero portfolio the development of the sectors follows pretty close that of Euro 750. Here 
interesting is that in 1988 the Oil & Gas and Technology sectors are more strongly represented 
than in Euro 750 portfolio. This might base to the same but opposite reasoning as in Top 25 that 
these two sectors require large amount of capital which is needed to invest and thus cannot be 
distributed to the shareholders. The sectors providing services are on contrary underrepresented 
in Zero portfolio compared to Euro 750. 
 
Repo portfolio is quite diversified sectorwise even though it held only 15 companies in 2008. 
From those results cannot be drawn any conclusions that stock repurchases would be 
concentrated to any specific sectors. 
 
Stock repurchases versus dividends in Europe 
 
Figure 3 depicts the number and the USD value of completed stock repurchase transactions in 
Europe from 1988 to 2008. Two interesting observations can be seen. First, the number of 
completed stock repurchases started to increase in the early 1990’s but the value of those 
transactions not until 1997. Before 1991 there was only four stock repurchases completed and 
they all were done in U.K. The total value of those four transactions was $128.38 million so they 
were very small compared to the paid dividends which in the same time period amounted 
$1,489.25. Second observation relates to the finding documented in the past studies that both the 
number and the value of the completed transactions fluctuate greatly over the years. These 
findings are similar those in Jagannathan et al. (2000) where they studied stock repurchase in 
U.S. stock market. They concluded that firms use stock repurchases relatively more during 
booms and reduce them during recessions. Even though, Jagannathan et al. studied different time 
period from 1985 to 1996 the results are very different from U.S. market to European. In U.S. 
market 55% of the repurchase announcements were actually carried out whereas in my study 
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from 1988 to 2008 only 22 % of the authorizations were executed. Furthermore, the difference in 
size of the completed transactions is enormous between U.S. and Europe. From 1988 to 1996 in 
U.S. the size of the completed transactions was $229 billion compared to $0.7 billion ($1.5 
billion total authorizations) in Europe. These results might derive from various sources but 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) concluded that U.S. corporations have substituted dividends with 
stock repurchases. And this is especially the case with established companies. They also 
concluded that dividends and stock repurchases and substitutes rather than complements in U.S. 
companies. 
 
This fluctuation is especially noticeable when compared to the development of the dividend 
payments which are represented in Figure 4. The total dividend payments has increased steadily 
at an annual rate of 14.58%. This is almost double the rate at which dividend grew in U.S. 
between 1980 to 2000 in Grullon and Michaely (2002).  
 
Figure 3.  Development of stock repurchases in Europe in 1988 – 2007 
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The dividends adjust to booms and recessions but changes are much more modest. From the 
figure 4 can be seen that dividend payments follow rather closely the overall performance of the 
stock market which can be seen in Figure 2. The logarithmic development (not disclosed here) 
confirms the same steady growth in dividends  
 
The dividends differ as well from the Jagannathan et al. (2000) but the difference is not as 
drastic. U.S. companies paid out cash as dividends from 1988 to 1996 altogether $1040 billion 
whereas respective amount for European companies was $316 billions. Noticeable is yet the 
proportion of repurchases compared to dividends. While in U.S. the companies paid 20% of their 
cash distribution in form of stock repurchases at the same time European companies paid only 
2.02% as stock repurchases. Still this is inline with the Figure 3 where it is very distinctive that 
the total level of stock repurchases was very low before 1997 where after the level has fluctuated 
over the years but on average steadily increased. In Appendix D is presented in Figure 3 the 
comparison of dividends, announced stock repurchases and completed repurchases in Euros. The 
figure follows similar pattern as in von Heje and Meggingson (2008). 
 
 
Figure 4. Development of paid cash dividends in Europe 1988 - 2008 
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5. Results 
5.1. Europe wide study 
In this chapter the results from the study are presented. The Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo 
portfolio results are compared with four different measures. First, in Table 9 are the raw annual 
returns where no adjustments to the risk have been made. In Table 10 the portfolio returns are 
adjusted with Sharpe ratio. This measure adjusts the additional volatility investor bears when 
holding an undiversified portfolio. Third, in Table 11, are the risk-adjusted Treynor Ratios where 
returns are adjusted to the overall riskiness of the portfolio and Jensen’s alpha values that are in 
Table 12 and depict the excess returns over the ones predicted by the CAPM. 
 
Raw annual returns 
 
In Table 9 are presented the raw yearly compounded returns for the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and 
Repo portfolios. Total payout (“Total Payout”) portfolio is also calculated which is a combination 
of Top 25 and Repo portfolios5. Table 9 shows the comparison of portfolio returns where $1,000 
was invested in each of the portfolio according to their portfolio descriptions in Chapter 4.1. In 
Table 9 is shown the portfolios volatility excess to Euro 750 and the t-statistics. 
 
The highest full period average return is earned in Total Payout portfolio and on average the 
yearly returns of Top 25 portfolio is 320 basis points higher than in Euro 750 portfolio. The 
difference is even higher when comparing Top 25 to Zero or Repo portfolio. Also the annualized 
return calculated from the 21-year period monthly returns is 136 bps higher than Euro 750 and 
776 bps higher than Zero portfolio’s. Zero and Repo portfolios earn negative annualized return 
which means that if investor used this strategy for the 21-year period, she would have ended up 
with less nominal amount of cash in 2008 than she originally invested in 1988. Noteworthy is 
that although Top 25 does better in returnwise (excluding Total Payout portfolio); it also has 
smaller volatility  
                                                 
5
 Total payout was calculated with similar principles as Top 25 but the ranking measure was the sum of dividend 
yield and repurchase yield. The repurchase yield was calculated as a sum of repurchases carried out in one year 
divided by the market value in the end of that year. 
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Table 9.  Raw compound returns of the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios 1st April 1988 - 1st of 
December 2008 
Year Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
Total  
payout Top 25 Zero Repo
Total  
payout
1988 34.2 % 51.4 % 54.6 % -6.3 % 51.4 % -2.16* -2.72* 1.01  -2.27*
1989 9.2 % 9.5 % 28.4 % 22.7 % 18.0 % 0.02  -2.11* -1.07  -1.03  
1990 -14.7 % -10.9 % -26.6 % -45.6 % -10.8 % -0.77  1.78* 1.08  -0.69  
1991 12.2 % -8.6 % 0.3 % -3.2 % 1.53* 1.46* 0.64  0.99  
1992 16.3 % 24.4 % 10.0 % -50.9 % 14.5 % -0.89  0.97  1.11  -0.29  
1993 37.2 % 110.9 % 26.8 % 86.2 % 106.4 % -3.39* 1.09  -1.77* -3.34*
1994 -17.0 % -23.0 % -20.3 % -13.5 % -21.3 % 0.85  0.99  -0.42  0.66  
1995 15.6 % 10.5 % -2.7 % 27.0 % 9.0 % 0.38  2.24* -0.79  0.65  
1996 32.3 % 42.2 % 28.6 % -5.1 % 45.4 % -1.06  0.38  0.78  -0.19  
1997 36.0 % 22.0 % 39.9 % 38.9 % 32.4 % 0.88  -0.29  -0.19  0.29  
1998 -2.3 % -27.7 % 16.7 % -7.0 % -30.6 % 1.47* -1.36  0.26  1.63*
1999 37.1 % 14.1 % 53.6 % -5.5 % -4.1 % 1.26  -1.09  3.01* 2.03*
2000 3.9 % 41.6 % -44.8 % 19.5 % 40.7 % -2.81* 3.96* -0.95  -2.49*
2001 -7.8 % 9.1 % -27.2 % 2.9 % 9.0 % -1.36* 1.18  -0.92  -1.43*
2002 -43.2 % -34.2 % -50.7 % -43.6 % -31.8 % -1.61* 0.72  -0.53  -1.88*
2003 26.7 % 12.4 % 35.5 % 19.8 % 64.2 % 1.12  -0.84  0.08  -1.98*
2004 9.2 % 11.0 % -2.1 % 6.4 % 4.8 % -0.23  1.99* 0.46  0.52  
2005 41.0 % 48.6 % 46.1 % 44.9 % 40.5 % -0.84  -0.81  -0.34  0.15  
2006 3.8 % -8.8 % 14.2 % -1.4 % -6.6 % 1.06  -0.49  0.71  0.73  
2007 -21.9 % -23.6 % -28.4 % -26.5 % -27.0 % 0.28  1.59* 0.66  0.91  
2008 -25.6 % -21.7 % -43.4 % -37.2 % -30.4 % -0.56  1.82* 1.53* 0.71  
Average full period 8.66 % 11.86 % 5.17 % 1.28 % 12.88 %
Average 1988 - 1998 16.11 % 22.83 % 13.92 % 5.92 % 24.18 %
Average 1998 - 2008 1.89 % 1.89 % -2.79 % -2.51 % 2.61 %
Annulized 5.93 % 7.44 % -0.48 % -4.05 % 7.51 %
Volatility 1988 - 1998 - 0.15 % 0.21 % 2.89 % 0.85 %
Volatility 1998 - 2008 - -0.48 % 2.36 % 3.43 % 0.21 %
Raw returns for each portfolio is calculated from the monthly realized returns and it shows the return in one year when
$1,000 was invested in each of the security in the portfolio in the beginning of the year. The standard deviation
differences shows the excess standard deviation to the Euro 750 standard deviation. Student's t-test was calculated as
shown in Equation 5. * Statistically significant result at 10% level.
t-test
 
than other portfolios. Zero and Repo portfolios have noticeable higher standard deviations to the 
market. Even though it does not seem follow any pattern, they have higher returns in the years 
when the standard deviation is high as well. 
 
If the timeline is divided into two decades and only the latter one is under scrutiny two interesting 
observations can be brought up. First, the Euro 750 and Top 25 earn the same average annual 
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return but Zero and Repo portfolios yield over -250 bps negative return on average in each year. 
On the other hand, the Total Payout portfolio earns higher average annual returns than any other 
portfolio. This implies that concentrating only on dividend yield leaves something essential out of 
the scope. Secondly, if the Top 25 loses in the last ten year period in returnwise, it gains in even 
lower volatility than in full time period to market since its standard deviation to market portfolio 
is -0.48% compared to Euro 750 and -0.69% compared to Total Payout portfolio. The Total 
Payout portfolio does not posses the same characteristics as Top 25 since it has volatility higher 
than market portfolio. This is consistent with the idea that companies that pay steady, high 
dividend are more defensive by nature than companies that pay dividends and repurchase their 
own stock (Trojanowski & Renneboog 2006, Jagannathan et al., 2000). 
 
Top 25 outperformed the two other portfolios 8 years, Euro 750 2 years, Zero portfolio 6 years, 
Repo portfolio 2 years and Total Payout portfolio 3 years out of 21. From this perspective it 
cannot be affirmatively stated that any of these strategies would be superior in all circumstances. 
When examining the t-statistics of the returns for the portfolios can be observed that none of 
those have consistently different returns from Euro 750. In Table 9 the levels statistically 
different at 10% are marked with an asterisk. Top 25, Zero, Repo and Total Payout portfolios 
have statistically different returns in 7, 9, 3 and 8 years out of 21, respectively. The Total Payout 
portfolio has a streak of statistically significant annual returns from 1998 to 2003 but thereafter 
the difference is even less significant than in Top 25. 
 
From these results it is hard to find any similarities to the previous studies in the overlapping time 
periods. Filbeck and Visscher (1997) covered the time period from 1985 to 1994 and 
Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) period from 1994 to 2007. Combining their results could be argued 
that high dividend yield portfolio dominated FTSE-100 during 1985 to 1988. The FTSE-100 was 
long dominant from 1989 to 1999 and high dividend yield portfolio dominated again between 
2000 and 2007. Even if the Zero portfolio is removed from the results data set is so different that 
any resembles are non-existent. Interesting is that when Zero portfolio is excluded from the 
examination the Top 25 outperformed the market only 12 years out of 21 i.e. 57%. This implies 
that introducing Zero portfolio as an alternative it is mainly competing with Euro 750 than with 
Top 25. 
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Sharpe ratios 
 
In Table 10 is presented the annual Sharpe ratios for Euro 750, Top 25, Zero, Repo and Total 
Payout portfolios. The Sharpe ratio shows how much excess return investor receives for taking 
one additional unit of risk. The Sharpe ratio is explained in more detail in Chapter 4.2. The 
portfolio returns and the standard deviation of the returns were the same as in raw returns 
comparison. 
 
On average the Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios outperform other portfolios; the latter one on 
the first decade and the first one on the last decade. The figures could be interpreted e.g. so that 
when utilizing high dividend yield or Total Payout investing strategy investor receives almost 
30% more excess return for bearing more risk on her investment than placing her money on the 
market portfolio. And if investor utilizes zero or pure repurchase portfolio strategy instead of 
investing in market portfolio she is not rewarded but penalized when bearing more risk in her 
portfolio.  
 
In the examination of the last ten years Sharpe ratios the Top 25 beats all the other portfolios 
since it is the only one with a positive Sharpe value. The Sharpe values fluctuates the most in the 
Zero and Total Payout portfolios. The least fluctuation is in the Repo portfolio, which means that 
the Sharpe values are constantly low. When examining the portfolios with Sharpe ratio, Top 25 
outperformed the other portfolios 7 years, Euro 750 1 years and Zero portfolio 5 years, Repo 
portfolio in 4 years and Total Payout portfolio in 4 years out of 21. Even though Top 25 portfolio 
beats other portfolios using Sharpe risk-adjusted measure the pattern is not consistent enough to 
draw firm conclusions that Top 25 portfolio is better than its comparison portfolios.  
 
Comparing Sharpe ratios to ones obtained by Filbeck and Visscher (1997), Filbeck and Visscher 
(2003), Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) no resembles cannot be found. Only the similar pattern of 
Sharpe ratios following the raw return in annual domination is consistent with these results and 
the previous ones. 
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Table 10. Sharpe index of the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo (1st April 
1988 - 1st December 2008) 
Year Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
payout
1988 1.28 1.88 2.08 -0.14 1.88
1989 0.14 0.16 1.05 0.70 0.59
1990 -0.76 -0.65 -1.23 -1.79 -0.65
1991 0.40 -0.34 -0.11 -0.14
1992 0.55 0.69 0.36 -0.60 0.45
1993 1.99 3.22 1.50 2.37 3.28
1994 -1.72 -2.04 -2.14 -0.90 -2.07
1995 0.74 0.34 -0.36 1.12 0.27
1996 1.56 1.69 1.13 -0.05 1.62
1997 1.56 1.14 1.73 1.80 1.53
1998 -0.11 -1.54 0.45 -0.31 -1.38
1999 1.65 0.56 2.07 -0.61 -0.38
2000 -0.11 2.76 -2.75 0.77 2.50
2001 -0.35 0.43 -0.72 0.12 0.43
2002 -2.34 -1.84 -1.95 0.03 -1.62
2003 1.26 0.71 1.18 0.65 2.18
2004 0.72 0.87 -0.20 0.45 0.30
2005 2.03 2.40 1.97 2.19 2.14
2006 -0.01 -0.90 0.43 -0.34 -0.63
2007 -1.85 -1.79 -2.30 -1.81 -2.15
2008 -1.40 -1.00 -1.97 -1.61 -1.33
Average full period 0.25 0.32 0.01 0.10 0.33
Average 1988 - 1998 0.58 0.61 0.40 0.28 0.68
Average 1998 - 2008 -0.05 0.06 -0.35 -0.04 0.01
The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return per unit of risk in the
portfolio. It characterizes how well the return of a portfolio compensates
for the taken risk. It is calculated from the monthly excess return and
adjusted for a one year.
 
Treynor and alpha measure 
 
In Table 11 are the Treynor measures and beta values. Using the Treynor measure, where the 
portfolio beta is adjusted to be the same as in the market portfolio, the Top 25 and TP portfolio 
outperform the other portfolios. The average annual realized returns6 are also shown in the 
                                                 
6
 The Treynor measure adjusts the excess return of the portfolio for the risk thus the realized return is just the 
Treynor measure added with the average risk-free return. 
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Table 11. Treynor measures and beta values of the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st 
December 2008. 
Year Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
Payout Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
Payout
1988 27.2 % 49.3 % 55.3 % -10.1 % 49.3 % 0.86 0.86 1.30 0.89
1989 1.2 % 2.2 % 24.0 % 15.6 % 12.0 % 0.84 0.85 0.94 0.83
1990 -22.0 % -21.7 % -36.4 % -188.5 % -21.9 % 0.72 0.93 0.28 0.83
1991 7.1 % -11.6 % -5.3 % - -7.1 % 1.04 0.91 - 1.18
1992 12.9 % 18.8 % 8.1 % -29.4 % 9.3 % 1.15 0.82 1.84 1.17
1993 34.2 % 88.9 % 30.3 % 70.0 % 91.3 % 0.98 0.79 1.19 1.13
1994 -21.6 % -33.1 % -30.3 % -16.8 % -33.6 % 0.98 0.82 1.08 0.77
1995 10.2 % 4.3 % -7.4 % 25.1 % 3.2 % 0.88 1.09 0.86 1.13
1996 27.2 % 36.0 % 21.3 % -9.3 % 41.6 % 0.86 1.11 1.09 0.87
1997 30.9 % 34.6 % 45.2 % 48.7 % 44.1 % 0.60 0.77 0.70 0.60
1998 -7.0 % -67.0 % 8.9 % -17.8 % -58.8 % 0.46 1.35 0.66 0.59
1999 32.3 % 15.3 % 56.4 % -18.1 % -15.3 % 0.71 0.87 0.57 0.62
2000 -1.9 % 82.0 % -35.9 % 19.5 % 85.1 % 0.28 1.41 0.70 0.41
2001 -10.8 % 10.7 % -21.3 % -0.1 % 10.6 % 0.67 1.41 0.89 0.56
2002 -44.8 % -44.3 % -43.1 % -19.1 % -40.6 % 0.82 1.21 2.37 0.82
2003 25.7 % 17.3 % 26.7 % 17.6 % 69.8 % 0.72 1.29 1.07 0.91
2004 7.6 % 13.3 % -3.4 % 5.5 % 3.5 % 0.74 1.07 0.88 0.88
2005 37.6 % 54.3 % 41.3 % 51.4 % 45.2 % 0.85 1.03 0.81 0.83
2006 -1.0 % -22.1 % 10.9 % -6.9 % -17.1 % 0.67 0.86 0.90 0.67
2007 -26.0 % -30.0 % -35.8 % -30.5 % -35.7 % 0.90 0.91 1.00 0.87
2008 -26.7 % -25.5 % -43.5 % -34.1 % -29.1 % 0.88 1.02 1.12 1.08
Average full period 4.40 % 8.17 % 3.14 % -6.36 % 9.80 % 0.79 1.02 1.01 0.84
Average 1988 - 1998 10.73 % 16.76 % 10.48 % -10.53 % 18.82 % 0.89 0.89 1.03 0.94
Average 1998 - 2008 -1.36 % 0.37 % -3.54 % -2.95 % 1.59 % 0.70 1.13 1.00 0.75
Realized 8.66 % 13.27 % 6.24 % -2.10 % 14.06 %
Treynor measure adjusts the return when the portfolio holds the same systematic risk as fully-diversified market portfolio.
It relates the excess returns in a year to the beta coefficient of the portfolio. Returns are calculated on yearly basis. Beta
coefficient is calculated as portfolio returns’ relation to the market portfolio.
Beta valuesTreynor measure
  
Table 11. Although Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios outperform their peer group by a wider 
margin than on raw average annual returns, they only outperform the two other portfolios in 6 
and 4 years out of 21 years, respectively. From this perspective it cannot be stated affirmatively 
that any of these strategies would be superior in all circumstances. When looking into the beta 
values of these two portfolios can be affirmed that the 0.79 beta for Top 25 and 0.84 beta for 
Total Payout portfolio are in line with the theory (e.g. Trojanowski & Renneboog 2006). The 
lowest beta is in pure high dividend yield portfolio where including high repurchase yield 
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companies increases the risk as the repurchases are paid from temporary earnings which fluctuate 
more (Jagannathan et al., 2000). This is valid also when the two other, Zero and Repo portfolios, 
are examined since their beta values are 1.0 and higher. Although, the higher beta values might 
derive from different sources, since Zero portfolio companies are smaller (Table 5 and Grullon 
and Michaely, 2002 for U.S. data) and Repo companies are bigger, both have higher earnings 
volatility. 
 
When examining only the last ten year period the beta values are more diverge. The average 
annual beta value for Top 25 portfolio from 1998 to 2008 is on average 0.70 and in none of the 
years does its beta value exceed 0.90 and in general it has shifted downwards. In Total Payout 
portfolio the beta value is 0.75 and but it has more extreme values than Top 25. This implies that 
including high repurchase yield companies into the portfolio increases the total level of risk as 
well. As for the Zero and Repo portfolios, the average annual beta values are 1.13 and 1.00, 
respectively. And only in three years out of ten the Zero portfolios beta values go below 1.0. 
 
Jensen’s alpha measures are calculated in Table 12 to find out the excess return over the SML 
return predicted by the CAPM. The Jensen’s alpha measures are the highest for the Top 25 and 
Total Payout portfolios. Even though, the average annual alpha values for Top 25 and Total 
Payout portfolios are positive, it is not the case consistently and statistically this result could have 
occurred by chance. Yet, if the 10% of the extreme positive and negative alpha values are 
excluded from the study the annual average alpha value remains still positive for each of the 
periods. The same applies to the Zero portfolio. If 10% of the extreme positive and negative 
alpha values are removed the Zero portfolio the average annual alpha value remains negative. 
The great improvement in Repo alpha values for the second decade is driven mainly by the huge 
60.9% alpha in 2002. If this is excluded from the sample the alpha value becomes negative. Also 
noteworthy is that for the last ten year period from 1998 to 2008 the alpha values retain their sign 
but Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios average annual alpha value is now much lower now 
equaling only 61 bps and 109 bps, respectively. For Zero the divergence from SML and its 
average annual alpha value is -374 bps and for Repo divergence is in the opposite direction as 
(even the 2002 alpha value excluded) the gap diminishes. 
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Table 12. Jensen's Alpha values of the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo 
portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st December 2008 
Year Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
Payout
1988 19.9 % 24.2 % -48.8 % 19.9 %
1989 0.7 % 19.3 % 13.5 % 9.0 %
1990 0.2 % -13.4 % -46.7 % 0.1 %
1991 -22.1 % -11.2 % - -16.7 %
1992 6.6 % -3.9 % -78.0 % -4.4 %
1993 66.4 % -3.0 % 42.6 % 64.7 %
1994 -9.6 % -7.2 % 5.2 % -9.3 %
1995 -7.0 % -19.2 % 12.8 % -8.1 %
1996 9.0 % -6.6 % -39.8 % 14.0 %
1997 1.8 % 11.0 % 12.3 % 8.2 %
1998 -29.0 % 21.5 % -7.1 % -31.1 %
1999 -10.2 % 20.8 % -28.6 % -27.8 %
2000 36.6 % -47.9 % 15.1 % 35.7 %
2001 12.2 % -15.0 % 9.5 % 12.0 %
2002 0.4 % 2.0 % 60.9 % 3.4 %
2003 -5.5 % 1.3 % -8.6 % 40.0 %
2004 4.0 % -11.8 % -1.8 % -3.8 %
2005 13.9 % 3.8 % 11.1 % 6.2 %
2006 -13.0 % 10.2 % -5.3 % -10.7 %
2007 -3.7 % -8.9 % -4.5 % -8.5 %
2008 1.1 % -17.2 % -8.4 % -2.7 %
Average full period 3.46 % -2.44 % -4.73 % 4.29 %
Average 1988 - 1998 6.58 % -1.01 % -14.09 % 7.73 %
Average 1998 - 2008 0.61 % -3.75 % 2.94 % 1.17 %
Jensen’s alpha determines the excess return of the portfolio of securities
over the portfolio's theoretical expected return. Returns are calculated on
yearly basis.
Jensen's alpha values
 
Conclusion with Treynor ratios is similar with the examination of Sharpe ratios when comparing 
to Filbeck and Visscher (1997), Filbeck and Visscher (2003), Brzeszczynski et al. (2008). In all 
studies the Treynor ratio adjusted returns retain their order of yearly dominance quite 
consistently. In the previous studies only Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) calculated the Jensen’s 
alpha measure as well in their study the alphas were positive 62% of the time which is the exact 
same frequency as in this study. When Zero portfolio is excluded from the assessment the Top 25 
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dominates 62% of the time i.e. 13 years out of 21 thus can be argued that the Top 25 performs at 
least as well risk-adjusted, as measured with raw compound returns. 
 
5.2. Longer investing periods 
As the one year investing period is rather short to draw any affirmative conclusions of a strategy 
to be efficient or inefficient, I also form the portfolios so that $1,000 is invested in each of the 
portfolios according to their investing description and the performance is evaluated over three-
year, ten-year and 21-year investing period. I am motivated to do so because the previous studies 
(Filbeck and Visscher (2003), Brzeszczynski et al. (2008)) have exhibited that longer investment 
period offer some interesting results as the dominance of high dividend yield portfolios is clearer 
with the longer investing horizon. In the comparison of these multiyear results to the previous 
one-year studies, must be stressed that they are executed on a single market whereas I have in this 
study 16 different markets included. I also compare the results with the same risk-adjusted 
measures as with the one-year portfolios. 
 
Raw returns for longer investing periods 
 
Table 13 presents raw returns for the three, ten and 21-year investing periods. On average the 
Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios have over 9% higher average three-year returns than Euro 
750 and over 10% higher returns than Zero and Repo portfolios. These two portfolios clearly 
underperform the Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios since their annualized return is significantly 
lower i.e. if the investor had followed the three-year investing strategy from 1988 to 2008 the 
annual return would have been almost ten times lower. The volatilities compared to Euro 750 are 
in longer investing periods higher (and also almost the same) on Top 25 and Total Payout 
portfolios and lower in Zero and Repo portfolios. In ten year investing period the Top 25 
portfolio outperforms the peer group by wider margin in absolute return terms. In the latter ten-
year period it is also the only portfolio along with Total Payout portfolio that managed to yield 
positive return, yet the return is almost four times higher than in Total Payout portfolio. 
 
In the 21-year period the Repo portfolio does not have any values since it contained only one 
company and thus the comparison would have been trivial. Also the Total Payout portfolio  
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Table 13.  Raw compound returns of the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios multi-year portfolios 
Year Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
Total  
payout Top 25 Zero Repo
Total  
payout
1988 - 1991 29.4 % 59.6 % 40.3 % 31.2 % 59.6 % -1.73* -0.67  -0.28  -1.73*
1991 - 1994 80.9 % 108.4 % 33.6 % - 142.8 % -0.91  2.17* - -1.67*
1994 - 1997 28.6 % 5.9 % 13.4 % 32.3 % 6.3 % 0.97  0.96  -0.21  1.07  
1997 - 2000 98.8 % 55.4 % 108.3 % -22.3 % 36.4 % 0.79  -0.36  1.55* 1.17  
2000 - 2003 -33.7 % 31.3 % -73.8 % -4.0 % 27.0 % -2.81* 3.21* -1.88* -3.53*
2003 - 2006 109.6 % 120.9 % 108.6 % 98.9 % 202.0 % -0.33  -0.15  -0.04  -2.01*
2006 - 2008 -34.5 % -36.8 % -38.9 % -36.9 % -26.4 % 0.08  0.14  0.25  -0.61  
Annulized 3Y 10.7 % 11.8 % 1.9 % 2.9 % 14.2 %
1988 - 1998 296.0 % 404.6 % 313.4 % - 404.6 % -1.21  -0.32  - -1.21  
1998 - 2008 -13.3 % 53.3 % -63.7 % 14.0 % 13.0 % -1.15  1.18  1.18  -0.56  
Annulized 10Y 8.9 % 10.4 % 2.0 % - 8.8 %
1988 - 2008 251.8 % 405.3 % 398.2 % - 405.3 % -0.97  -1.08  - -0.97  
Annulized 20Y 7.2 % 8.1 % 8.0 % - 8.1 %
Raw returns from a portfolio are calculated from the monthly realized returns and it shows the return in the period when
$1,000 was invested in each of the security in the portfolio in the beginning of the three-year, 10-year or 21-year period.
The standard deviation differences shows the excess standard deviation to the Euro 750 standard deviation. Repo
portfolio did not have enough companies in each of the year to have value calculated. Student's t-test was calculated
as shown in Equation 5. * Statistically significant result at 10% level.
t-testCompound multiyear returns
 
contained exactly the same companies as the Top 25 portfolio did. In the full 21-year period the 
Top 25 beats the Euro 750 and Zero portfolios.  Interesting in the 21-year period is that although 
Zero portfolio underperforms in all other investing periods, it now beats the Euro 750 and 
achieves practically the same returns as the Top 25 portfolio. This is mainly result from the 
extraordinary performance during the IT boom from 1st of September 1999 to 1st of September 
2000. 
 
When the portfolios were held for three years there was no clear dominance by any of the three. 
Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios dominated together in 18 years out of 21. If Repo and Total 
Payout portfolios are excluded the Top 25 beat the others in 12 years, Euro 750 six years and 
Zero in one three year period. The Top 25 portfolio outshines all the other portfolios by a wider 
margin when the investing period in prolonged to 10 years.  
 56 
In the first ten year period Top 25 beats Euro 750 and Zero portfolios over 100%. Annually the 
difference to Euro 750 and Zero portfolios is 140 bps and 840 bps, respectively. As mentioned in 
the previous paragraph, in the full 21-year period the composition is very different. In the 21-year 
period the Top 25 is winner when winner must be announced but the Zero portfolio is the second 
with only 710 bps margin, which can be considered to be fairly small margin in investing period 
spanning over two decades. This difference means on annual level a difference of 7 bps. The 
superior 21-year performance of Zero portfolio is mainly because of one single stock, Ericsson 
AB, which contributed almost 30% of the portfolios performance. If the investor had purchased 
Ericsson AB in 1st of April 1988 it would have peaked at 314 times more valuable than at the 
time of initial purchase. If that single stock is excluded from the portfolio the Zero portfolio’s 
return is still fair resulting 284.5%. It would be still higher than market portfolio return but much 
lower than the reported in Table 13. 
 
The volatilities are not insensitive to the longer investing periods although the pattern of Zero 
portfolio having higher volatility compared to Euro 750 and Top 25 holds true for all the longer 
periods. As mentioned in Chapter 5.1 the volatility of Top 25 was on average lower than for Euro 
750, but now in the longer investing periods the volatilities of Top 25 to the Euro 750 are higher 
in all multiyear periods. Nonetheless it cannot be said the volatility to exceeding market portfolio 
would linearly rise as a function to the length of the investing period. 
 
The t-statistics for the longer periods are somewhat parallel to the t-statistics for the one-year 
returns. For Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios two three-year periods and for Total Payout 
portfolio four three-year periods out of 7 the statistics are significant on 10% level and in none of 
the portfolios the returns in 10-year or 21-year periods are statistically significantly different from 
Euro 750 portfolios returns. 
 
Sharpe ratio for the longer investing periods 
 
Quick summary from the previous chapter was that Top 25 beat the other portfolios especially in 
the two longest, 10-year and 21-year investing periods but at the cost of higher volatility. In this 
chapter the returns are adjusted this volatility and the portfolios are compared with Sharpe ratio.  
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Table 14. Sharpe index of the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo multi-year 
portfolio 1st April - 1st December 
Year Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
payout
1988 - 1991 0.17 -0.69 -1.27 -0.19 -0.69
1991 - 1994 0.86 1.51 1.21 - 1.58
1994 - 1997 0.31 1.39 1.79 0.86 1.12
1997 - 2000 0.92 1.41 1.42 -0.72 0.59
2000 - 2003 -0.78 -0.33 -2.31 -1.59 -1.28
2003 - 2006 1.54 2.95 1.87 1.61 2.03
2006 - 2008 -0.91 -1.08 -2.09 -1.40 -0.31
1988 - 1998 0.53 0.60 0.52 - 0.60
1998 - 2008 -0.14 0.13 -0.29 0.01 0.01
1988 - 2008 0.19 0.27 0.26 - 0.27
Average 0.30 0.74 0.09 -0.24 0.43
The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return per unit of risk in the
portfolio. It characterizes how well the return of a portfolio compensates
for the taken risk. It is calculated from the monthly excess return and
adjusted for the three-year, 10-year or 21-year period.
 
 
In Table 14 are presented the multiyear period Sharpe ratios for all the portfolios. The Sharpe 
ratio was explained in more detail in Chapter 4.2. The results align with the ones from the 
comparison of the raw returns presented in Table 13. The Sharpe ratio, the reward for volatility, 
declines in Euro 750 and Top 25 portfolios when the investing periods lengthens. Also the 
positive difference for the Top 25 to Euro 750 diminishes as the periods are longer. Still Top 25 
offers over double the reward compared to Euro 750 or Total Payout portfolios for the additional 
risk that investor bears when the investing periods is either three or ten years long. 
 
Zero and Repo portfolios behave quite the opposite as the two other portfolios. In Table 14 the 
difference of Top 25 and Zero portfolios Sharpe ratios were 32-to-1 for the one-year, for the three 
year period 8-to-1, for the 10-year period 3-to-1 and for the 21-year period the Sharpe ratios are 
at par. The Repo portfolios average three-year Sharpe is negative and in the latter ten-year period 
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it is marginally positive but still much lower than in any other portfolios. So the behavior is quite 
the opposite from Top 25 and Euro 750, the Sharpe ratios declines as the investing period 
prolongs. Investor is less rewarded for the taken additional risk, yet the difference of Top 25 to 
Euro 750 almost 40%. The poor performance of the Repo portfolio when measured in Sharpe 
ratio might be explained the fact the repurchases are paid out of the temporary, non-operating 
cash flows and do not provide that much information for the longer investing periods. 
Furthermore, the greater volatility in repurchases compared to dividend impairs the performance 
for the Repo portfolio (Jagannathan et al., 2002). 
 
Treynor measure and Jensen’s alpha for longer investing periods 
 
Prolonging the investing period has an effect on many variables of the portfolios such as returns 
and volatilities. The beta is not insensitive variable either as it changes in relation to the period 
length. The beta values are discussed later in this chapter but first is examined the Treynor 
measure when the portfolio is adjusted to have the same systematic risk as the market portfolio as 
in this case the Euro 750. 
 
In Table 15 are presented the Treynor measures for the five portfolios. The average three-year 
return for Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios is almost double compared to Euro 750. In Zero 
portfolio the difference to market portfolio is two times lower and in Repo portfolio the average 
Treynor measure is negative. The winners are the same as they were when ranked with raw 
returns same as in Visscher and Filbeck (2003) and Brzeszczynski et al. (2008). And now while 
the returns are adjusted the Top 25 outperform the other portfolios also in the 21-year period. The 
reason for Zero portfolio’s reduced performance is found in the high beta value, which is inline 
with the hypotheses that zero dividend companies have higher beta values same as in Blume 
(1980). Based on the results this holds also in the longer investing periods. 
 
The beta values are in line with hypotheses when the investing period was only one year long. 
Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios had beta values below and Zero portfolio above 1.0. In both 
portfolios the betas increase as the investing period prolongs. The beta for Top 25 was on average 
0.79 in one year periods and for three year periods it is 0.92 and it rises to 1.02 as the investing 
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Table 15. Treynor measure of the Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and Repo multi-year portfolio 1st April - 1st December 
Year Euro 750 Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
Payout Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
Payout
1988 - 1991 5.4 % 34.6 % 17.0 % 6.6 % 34.6 % 1.03 0.95 1.09 1.03
1991 - 1994 69.0 % 85.6 % 23.3 % - 111.3 % 1.13 0.93 -0.03 1.18
1994 - 1997 12.9 % -9.0 % -2.2 % 19.5 % -9.4 % 1.09 1.06 0.85 1.00
1997 - 2000 83.5 % 56.6 % 91.2 % -74.4 % 30.6 % 0.71 1.02 0.51 0.69
2000 - 2003 -44.4 % 27.2 % -74.1 % -16.7 % 19.6 % 0.76 1.14 0.88 0.83
2003 - 2006 103.6 % 146.4 % 85.3 % 79.9 % 209.0 % 0.78 1.20 1.16 0.94
2006 - 2008 -44.7 % -50.7 % -52.0 % -58.7 % -44.7 % 0.93 0.94 0.80 0.82
1988 - 1998 227.3 % 404.6 % 242.1 % - 316.1 % 1.06 1.01 - 1.06
1998 - 2008 -46.8 % 53.3 % -78.7 % 22.6 % 37.6 % 0.68 1.26 0.80 0.73
1988 - 2008 112.4 % 260.4 % 216.9 % - 260.4 % 1.02 1.19 - 1.02
Average 47.8 % 100.9 % 46.9 % -3.0 % 96.5 % 0.92 1.07 0.76 0.93
Treynor measure
Treynor measure adjusts the return when the portfolio holds the same systematic risk as fully-diversified market
portfolio. It relates the excess returns in a year to the beta coefficient of the portfolio. Jensen’s alpha determines the
excess return of the portfolio of securities over the portfolio's theoretical expected return. Returns are calculated on
three-, ten- and 21-year basis. Beta coefficient is calculated as portfolio returns’ relation to the market portfolio.
Beta values
 
period extends to 21-year long. Noteworthy is that both in Top 25 and in Total Payout portfolios 
the high beta values are greatly influenced by the first decade from 1988 to 1997 and are much 
lower if only the last decade is examined. For Zero portfolio the beta was 1.02 in one year period 
and it is now 1.04 for three-year period and increases to 1.19 in the 21-year period. 
 
Jensen’s alphas presented in Table 16 follow quite the similar pattern as the other risk-adjusted 
measures. Top 25 and Total Payout portfolios have average three-year alpha 12.6% and 24.7%, 
respectively, compared to Zero and Repo portfolios’ negative alpha values of over -14.0%. On 
annual level excess return to the SML over 4.0% for Top 25 and Total Payout and -5.1% for Zero 
and Repo portfolio. In this contrast, the alpha values seem to increase in absolute value as the 
investing period lengthens. In one-year period the average annual alphas were over 3.4% for both 
Top 25 and Total Payout, and over -2.40% for Zero and Repo portfolios. For the 10-year period 
the alphas are 71.5% for Top 25 and -10.5% for Zero. Top 25 portfolios ten-year average alpha is 
even higher than the one of Total Payout portfolios. In all portfolios except  
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Table 16. Jensen's Alpha measure of the Top 25, Zero and Market 
Portfolio 1st April - 1st December multi-year portfolios 
Year Top 25 Zero Repo
Total 
Payout
1988 - 1991 30.0 % 11.1 % 1.3 % 30.0 %
1991 - 1994 18.8 % -42.6 % - 49.8 %
1994 - 1997 -23.9 % -16.0 % 5.6 % -22.4 %
1997 - 2000 -19.1 % 7.8 % -79.8 % -36.5 %
2000 - 2003 54.5 % -33.8 % 24.4 % 53.3 %
2003 - 2006 33.6 % -21.9 % -27.5 % 98.8 %
2006 - 2008 -5.5 % -6.9 % -11.2 % 0.0 %
1988 - 1998 94.4 % 15.0 % - 94.4 %
1998 - 2008 48.7 % -35.9 % 16.5 % 11.4 %
1988 - 2008 151.1 % 124.7 % - 151.1 %
Average 38.3 % -14.6 % -10.1 % 24.7 %
Jensen’s alpha determines the excess return of the portfolio of securities
over the portfolio's theoretical expected return. Returns are calculated on
three-, ten- and 21-year basis.
Jensen's alpha values
 
in Zero portfolio the annualized alphas stay the same or decrease as the investing periods 
prolongs. The Zero portfolio exhibits improvement in alphas as the investing period lengthens. In 
the 21-year investing period the alpha value for Zero portfolio is less than Top 25 portfolios 
151.1% but it is far from negative amounting 124.7%. 
 
Combining the results from Filbeck and Visscher (1997) and Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) where 
the longer investing period were dominant in the U.K. stock market from 1985 to 1990 and then 
again from 1996 to 2008. In-between the periods the FTSE-100 outperformed the high dividend 
yield portfolios. In Filbeck and Visscher (1997) the FTSE-100 also dominated the full 11-year 
period whereas in Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) the Top Ten portfolio outperformed the FTSE-100 
between 1994 and 2007 by a wide margin. In the multiyear investing periods the betas are higher 
than in one year investing periods in the two aforementioned studies as well as in the Filbeck and 
Visscher (2003). In the latter one the high dividend portfolio dominated the Toronto 35 and 300 
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indexes in the longer investing periods. In all three studies the results in the longer periods are 
also valid after adjusting for the risk. 
 
5.3. Performance during bull and bear market 
The special and very opposite characteristics of high and zero dividend yield companies makes 
them interesting subjects to study how they in different market conditions. Including the 
repurchase and combination portfolio (of Top 25 and Repo portfolios) completes examination 
and sheds more light on the development during the 21 years. The results were compared with 
three different definitions of bull and bear as aforementioned in Chapter 4.3. The time period was 
divided into four five-year periods as well as one full 21-year period to reveal the changes in the 
returns and betas over the 21-year period. The returns are calculated as logarithmic returns of the 
individual returns belonging to either bull or bear market. Rather than taking mere arithmetic 
averages this method takes into account the previous performance as well. The arithmetic 
averages were calculated as well (not disclosed in this study) and they did not reveal any drastic 
differences. The chronological break-down was chosen to give the best picture so that the period 
were short enough to show the timeline variation and long enough to hold enough data points to 
give accurate estimates for portfolio returns and beta values.  
 
The first definition for bull and bear market 
 
Table 17 shows the comparison of average time period returns and beta coefficients of the Euro 
750, Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios when their unadjusted monthly returns are sorted to 
belong to either bull market or to bear market period based on the first definition. In the first 
definition bull and bear market periods are defined monthly whenever the market portfolio return 
exceeds or goes below risk-free return. In the first five-year period from April 1988 to April 1993 
the results are somewhat inline with the hypotheses. Top 25 portfolio outperforms its peers with a 
clear margin during bear markets and Total Payout portfolio during bull markets. Interesting is 
that both of the dominating portfolios have rather high beta values and especially during bear 
markets. Moreover, against the hypotheses is that Zero portfolio has lower betas than these two  
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winner portfolios in both bull and bear market. Repo portfolio comprised of on average three 
companies which makes the results less reliable and comparable. The results in the first period 
could derive from the undeveloped market conditions and from the lack of diversification as Top 
25 and Repo portfolio were country wise less diversified than Euro 750, Zero or Total Payout 
portfolios. In the second period from April 1993 to April 1998 the Total Payout portfolio 
dominates both bull and bear market periods. If only Top 25 and Zero portfolios are to be 
compared the outcome is halfway in line with the hypotheses. The Top 25 dominates Zero 
portfolio and the market portfolio during bear market but it also dominates Zero and the market 
portfolio during bull market. The betas are also shifted from the first period. Now, three of the 
portfolios: Top 25, Zero and Total Payout have higher than one beta during bull market and 
lower than one during bear market. This implies that during bull market these three portfolios 
react more strongly to market portfolio’s upward movement and are less sensitive to decline in 
bear market than Euro 750.  
 
In the first period of the last decade from April 1998 to April 2003 results are more supportive to 
the hypotheses and can be considered to be more reliable since the Repo is larger measured by 
the number of companies thus it is also better diversified and less prone to firm-specific risk. 
Also the Zero and the Top 25 portfolios are more diversified country-wise and hence less prone 
to country-specific risk. The Repo portfolio beats the other portfolios during bull market. It must 
be reminded that Repo portfolio contains only four companies on average in the third period and 
the examination does not account for risk, which could greatly affect the results. If Repo portfolio 
is excluded from the comparison, the Zero portfolio prevails with almost similar returns. 
Noticeable difference between these two is the opposite beta values. While the Repo achieved its 
5.13% excess to the market return with a beta of 0.87, the Zero portfolio had beta value almost 
the double. During bear market Top 25 prevails with beta value below zero which is inline with 
the hypotheses. Interesting is that when looking back at the beta values of Repo portfolio during 
bear market periods it is significantly below zero in all first three periods. While the performance 
is inferior to the market, it still posses some defensive characteristics which could derive from the 
size factors: the fact that firms that repurchase are bigger in market capitalization are less prone 
to general market movements than others. Similar results about the size characteristics also in 
Grullon and Michaely (2002). Results in the last period from April 2003 to April 2008 are 
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notably different from the previous three. Three remarks can be made. First, results are in 
accordance with the hypotheses. Top 25 loses to market portfolio in bull market but during bear 
market it outperforms the market portfolio and the peer portfolios and also has beta below one. 
Second, the Zero portfolio is generally riskier measured by its beta value. This is noticeable 
during bear market when its beta is over 1.5. Opposite to the hypotheses it does not prevail either 
in the bull market. Third, the Repo portfolio follows the pattern from the previous time periods 
that it has positive excess returns to the market in bull market and negative in bear market. 
Remarkable is that now the beta in Repo portfolio is much higher; especially in bear market.  
 
The second definition for bull and bear markets 
 
The results for the second definition bull and bear market period are presented in the Table 18. 
The second definition classifies bull and bear market periods on monthly basis but defines bear 
market month surrounded by bull market months as bull market as well and vice versa. When 
bull and bear markets are defined to follow intermediate time period the results are consistent in 
the last decade but results from the first decade are very different. The excess returns to market 
portfolio are consistently smaller in bull market periods and less negative during bear market 
periods.  
 
In the first period from 1988 to 1993 Top 25 beats the market portfolio and the peer group in bear 
market as in the first definition but it now prevails during bull market as well, which is quite 
surprising considering the hypotheses. Top 25 earns positive excess returns to the market 
portfolio both in bull and bear market periods. These results could derive also from the lack of 
diversification in the Top 25 where the country concentration was significant. The beta values are 
also different than in the first definition. Now, Top 25, Zero, Repo and Total Payout portfolios 
have lower betas but Zero portfolio has remarkably higher beta. The betas imply that investing 
into high dividend yield companies would have been a risky investing strategy whereas investing 
into companies not paying any dividends would have been a defensive one. Again remark must 
be made that Repo portfolio contained only three firms on average in the first period which could 
drive the results.  
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The second five year period from April 1993 to April 1998 is interesting when examined through 
second definition compared to the first definition. The bull-bear market spread7 widens in Top 25 
and Total Payout portfolio and also shifts upwards towards bull market and narrows in Zero and 
Repo portfolios. None of the portfolios possess defensive qualities or characteristics and all have 
negative excess returns in bear market. The betas in Top 25 and Total Payout portfolio are now 
higher when using intermediate bull-bear definition. The excess returns to market portfolio are 
consistently smaller in bull market periods and less negative during bear market periods. 
 
Similarly when using the first definition the results are more reliable in the first period of the last 
decade from April 1998 to April 2003 as the portfolios are better diversified. The results are 
again partly supportive to the hypotheses. The beta value for Top 25 is now lower than in first 
definition and it earns positive excess return to the market during bear market. And even though 
Zero portfolio earns negative excess returns both in bull and bear market, it has high beta 
especially in bull market periods. Interesting is that Repo portfolio has again betas below one 
both in bull and bear market periods. Also the fact that including repurchase yields increases beta 
values during bull market periods and decreases betas in bear market periods is worth noticing. In 
this period this makes Total Payout portfolio to be aggressive during bull market and defensive in 
bear market. In the last five year period all the excess returns to the market portfolio are smaller 
than in the previous subperiods as they were according to the first definition. Now Top 25 earns 
only small positive excess return. Zero portfolio has high beta values and the highest excess 
return in bull market, which is in accordance with the hypotheses. Including repurchase yields 
into dividend yields seem to work positively in some periods but as can be seen, when comparing 
results from the first and the second definition, it also increases volatility into the beta values and 
the returns. This might derive from the fact that dividend payment are more stabile and 
repurchases which are paid out from the non-operating cash flows (Jagannathan et al. (1999), 
Grullon and Michaely (2002). 
 
                                                 
7
 The excess return difference between return difference to market portfolio during bull market less the excess return 
difference to market portfolio during bear market. 
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The third definition for bull and bear market 
 
The third definition for bull and bear market is interesting to investigate since it is as a definition 
very different from the two previous ones. It defines the bull and bear market periods 
retrospectively as the market has moved 10% from the previous low or high position, 
respectively. As can been seen from Table 19 the results vary more and are different from the 
first and the second definitions. The third definition smoothes away most of the single month 
variation, revealing the bull and bear market performance over a longer time span. It reveals 
whether an investing strategy has been consistently effective during the course of long-term 
market patterns. In the first five-year period from April 1988 to April 1993 the Top 25 prevails 
both in bull and bear market. Interesting is that its beta value is below 1.0 during bull market and 
above 1.0 during bear market. The Repo portfolio suffers, especially in bear market periods, from 
the poor diversification which is reflected also to the Total Payout portfolio. Noticeable is also 
that throughout the portfolios the beta values are higher except in the Top 25 portfolio.  This 
might imply that if the bull and bear market is defined more broadly, the portfolios start to go 
more along with the market portfolio. In the second five-year period from April 1993 to April 
1998 different combinations of repurchase portfolios dominate. The Total Payout portfolio beats 
its peers in bull market with a clear margin except for the Top 25 portfolio. This is intuitive since 
they to the most part hold the same constituents. These results suggest that including 
repurchasing companies increases returns both in bull and bear market at the cost of slightly 
higher beta. During bear market the Repo portfolio is the only portfolio that outperforms the 
market portfolio. Since it has beta over unity it cannot be considered as purely defensive portfolio 
instead the result could again originate from the lack of diversification. 
 
The third definition shuffles the pattern from the previous definitions so that from 1998 onwards 
the Top 25 does not anymore consistently prevail in bear market. In the period from April 1998 
to April 2003 the Repo portfolio dominates in bear market but has remarkably high beta value. 
Again the results of Repo portfolio might arise from idiosyncratic risk. If the Repo portfolio is 
excluded from the comparison then the best performers in bear market are Total Payout and Top 
25 portfolio. Zero portfolio fails to outperform the market portfolio both in bull and in bear 
market and in addition has high beta values in both market conditions. In the last five-year period 
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Zero portfolio barely beats Total Payout portfolio, the only other portfolio that was able to earn 
positive excess return to market portfolio in bull market. Yet, Zero portfolio has higher beta value 
in bull and bear market than Total Payout portfolio. During bear market, the Top 25 outperform 
its peer with a small positive margin to market portfolio and is the only portfolio that manages to 
do so. All-in-all, according to the third definition the outperforming the market portfolio, Euro 
750, is harder for any of the investing strategies.  
 
So what does these results imply put together. Three observations can be drawn. First, the results 
and the outcomes depend to some extent on the definitions. To achieve the results in real life 
would require nearly perfect foresight in all of the definitions but level of foresight decreases 
with definitions. The first definition, since it classifies bull and bear market based on one-month 
periods, is the most theoretical and hardest to employ in the real world. Investor would have to 
spot the bull and bear market before the month begins. In the second definition investor would 
have to recognize whether trend is permanently shifted or it is just a skew in the row. The third 
definition requires ability to identify long-term trend shift before they happen. And usually this is 
easiest when looking the past data. From April 1998 onwards the investor would have earned 
excess returns to the Euro 750 by buying Top 25 during bear market in any of the definitions and 
selling it off before bull market periods. The best investing practice during bull market is a bit 
more controversial since depending on the definition all the other portfolios except Top 25 
dominate at least one of the five-year bull market period. The second observation is that these 
patterns are stronger and more in line with hypotheses in the recent decade from 1998 to 2008. 
This could derive from various reasons. For example, the European market was very different 
and less diversified in 1988 to 1998 than it was in the latter decade. Also the because of the 
common currency the countries and markets have become even more unified which especially 
could mean streamlining the taxation systems. The market liquidity and integration has increased 
after launching the EMU in 1999 (Yiang et al., 2002). The third observation is a continuum from 
the previous reasoning. As the markets in Europe have become more liquid, efficient and unite 
the excess return differences to market portfolio have diminished when the longest time period 
definition are used and also the excess returns were larger and varied more in the first decade 
from 1988 to 1998 than in the latest one. 
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6. Sensitivity analyses 
 
In the following chapter the robustness checks are carried out. It is important to check these since 
the methods do not control for the variables. Moreover since many of the choices in the study are 
purely arbitrary e.g. number of high dividend portfolio companies or the definitions for the 
dividend yield. Also the starting date might have affect on the results, thus it is crucial to study 
these in order rule out their effect. I first check the number of companies, then the different 
definitions and last I show that different starting dates do not have a major influence on the 
results. 
 
6.1. Different number of portfolio companies 
As the number of the companies included in the Top 25 was arbitrary, it is important to validate 
the results studying whether increasing the number of the companies alters the results. I studied 
the performance of a high dividend yield portfolio where there were the original 25 but in 
addition 50 and 75 highest dividend yield companies. 
 
Raw returns for different number of portfolio companies 
 
Appendix A.1 shows the raw returns, volatility to market and t-statistics for portfolios with 25, 50 
or 75 highest dividend yielding companies in each rebalancing dates. From the Appendix A.1 can 
be seen that none of the portfolio compositions dominate consistently another but every single 
portfolio outperforms the Euro 750 and Zero portfolio. Three interesting observations can be 
noticed. First, positive excess return that existed in the first decade diminishes in all of the Top 
25 portfolios. Although, all of the high dividend yield portfolios beat market portfolio, the margin 
has become thinner. Second, as the return margin faded, has the volatilities decreased as well in 
all three portfolios. The high dividend yield portfolio had higher than market volatility in the first 
decade, but lower than market in the recent decade. Third, it seems that the requirements for 
diversification have increased during the years. While from 1988 to 1998 25 companies was 
enough to earn higher than market returns with moderately higher volatility that does not hold 
any more. Now 50 or 75 high dividend yield companies are required to form a properly 
diversified portfolio.  
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The examination of the t-statistics does not reveal any additional information to the previous tests 
as on average only 40% of the yearly returns differ statistically significantly from the Euro 750 
returns. 
 
Risk-adjusted returns for different number of portfolio companies 
 
The findings from the raw compound returns holds true when examined with Sharpe ratio in 
Appendix A.2. All of the high dividend yield portfolios have higher Sharpe ratios in all of the 
periods. Moreover, the Sharpe ratios are positive even in the last decade. The similar effects can 
be seen with Sharpe ratios as with the raw returns as they have declined both in market portfolio 
and in every dividend yield portfolio when studying the recent decade. In Appendix A.3 the 
Treynor measure confirms the previous findings as well. All of the portfolios beat market 
portfolio but difference has decreased and is only slightly positive. Treynor measure shows that 
better diversification improves the risk-adjusted performance. The beta values on the other hand 
increases with number of constituents. This implies two things. First, the Top 25 portfolio is the 
most defensive one. Second, as the number of constituents in high dividend yield portfolio comes 
near to the number of constituents in the market portfolio that beta values increases. In Appendix 
A.4 are presented the Jensen’s alpha values which also confirm the previous results. All of the 
alphas are positive on average even though no consistent pattern can be found, but alphas as well 
as the Sharpe ratio and Treynor measure, are lower in the last decade. 
 
6.2. Alternative definitions for high dividend yield portfolios 
As in the previous chapter, where different numbers of high dividend yield companies in the 
portfolio were examined, it is important to study whether changing the criteria for selecting the 
companies change the results. The first one is the normal Top 25 portfolio where the companies 
are selected based on their rolling 12 month average dividend yield. The second portfolio, 20% 
dividend yield (“20% DY portfolio”), is a portfolio where the maximum dividend yield is capped 
to 20% for a company to be selected into the portfolio. Any companies having higher 12-month 
average dividend yield are excluded. In the last portfolio, (“unmodified DY portfolio”), no 
alterations are done and the companies were selected based on their dividend yield in that specific 
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month without any rolling smoothing. In this chapter I only compare the two aforementioned 
portfolios as the results for the original Top 25 have been discussed in Chapter 5.1. 
 
Raw returns for alternative definitions of high dividend yield portfolios 
 
When comparing raw returns in Appendix B.1, it seems that using alternative definitions for the 
dividend yield has only small effect on the results when studying the raw compound returns. 
Especially capping the maximum dividend yield has only minor effect as it earns practically the 
same return and volatility in the recent decade and slightly higher return and volatility number in 
the first decade than Top 25. The unmodified DY portfolio earns higher returns in the last decade 
at the cost of higher volatility. 
 
Risk-adjusted returns for alternative definitions of high dividend yield portfolios 
 
Sharpe ratios shown in Appendix B.2 partially validate the aforementioned results. All of the 
portfolios beat the market portfolio in both decades and the unmodified DY portfolio has lower 
Sharpe ratio than the other high dividend yield portfolios. From this perspective can be said that 
looking at the dividend yield with a longer perspective is beneficial at risk-return point of view. 
On the other hand capping the maximum dividend yield does not improve the defensive qualities 
in risk-return perspective. Treynor ratios in Appendix B.3 confirm that all high dividend yield 
portfolios beat market portfolio when they are adjusted to hold similar systematic risk as the 
market portfolio. All portfolios beat market portfolio compared with Treynor measure. In the first 
decade the Top 25 outperformed its peers but in recent decade the 20% DY portfolio is ten times 
more efficient. From the beta values in Appendix B.3 can be seen that the unmodified DY 
portfolio is the riskiest when risk is measured by beta value. Jensen’s alpha measure offers 
different kind of results in Appendix B.4. When measured with Jensen’s alphas the Top 25 
portfolio is the best in all time periods except in the last ten year subperiod. This interesting since 
the unmodified DY portfolio loses in all the other measures except in the last decade when 
measured with alpha. 
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6.3. Alternative portfolio starting date 
Since this type of portfolio study is very sensitive to the underlying assumptions I have already 
tested different investing periods, alternative definitions for the high dividend yield portfolio 
selection criteria, and the last to be tested are the different starting dates for the Euro 750, Top 25, 
Zero and Repo portfolios. The results for Repo portfolio are reported in the Appendix C but 
receive less attention since the small number of companies in the Repo portfolio makes the 
results unreliable and very sensitive to changes. Thus any conclusions based on those results 
cannot be made. I present the results which include the same raw returns and risk-adjusted 
measures as in the previous chapters. 
 
In Appendix C.1 are presented the raw annual portfolio returns for Euro 750, Top 25, Zero and 
Repo portfolios. There can be observed that Top 25 portfolio beats all the other portfolios in 
every starting month both in average annual return as well as with annualized return, except for 
the July where Euro 750 earns slightly higher average annual and annualized return. The Zero 
portfolio loses to the two other portfolios in every alternative starting month both in average 
annual and annualized return. Interesting is that every alternative starting period yields negative 
annualized return which is quite a poor performance for 21-year investing period.  
 
If only the last decade is examined the results are not as clear and analogous. Top 25 portfolio 
beats Euro 750 in January and April portfolios but loses in July and October portfolios. From this 
point of view it seems that nowadays the portfolio initiation date plays significant role and the 
performance of the portfolio is sensitive to this. Volatility to market is constant as well both in 
Top 25 and Zero portfolios. In Top 25 the volatility does change in respect to the alternative 
starting month but stays constantly negative i.e. smaller than in market portfolio, in the recent 
decade. For Zero portfolio the results are as consistent but the opposite as the volatility to market 
stays persistently larger than in Euro 750. 
 
Top 25 risk-adjusted measures for alternative starting dates 
 
The results proposed by the raw returns are confirmed by the Sharpe ratio in Appendix C.2. The 
highest Sharpe ratios are in January and April portfolios and in the July portfolio the Sharpe ratio 
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is the lowest. Similarly, if only the last decade is under scrutiny the Sharpe ratios decrease 
noticeably. In July the average annual Sharpe ratio is even negative. In Appendix C.2 are in 
addition the beta values for the Top 25 portfolio. In the full time period the betas seem be 
insensitive to initiation dates, but studying 10-year subperiods reveal changes. Betas seem to be 
lower in the periods where the Top 25 outperforms the market, and increase as the performance 
fades. If only last decade is examined, the beta values diminish as the average annual beta for 
1998 to 2008 is approximately 0.70. 
 
Treynor measure, where Top 25 was adjusted to have the same systematic risk as the market 
portfolio i.e. Euro 750 is presented in Appendix C.2. Compared with Treynor measure the result 
are somewhat different from the previous ones. Now all the Top 25 portfolios, except in January, 
beat the market portfolio and the realized adjusted return is between 8.8% and 13.3%. Even the 
July portfolio beats the Euro 750. The Jensen’s alpha values follow the similar pattern as the raw 
returns and Sharpe ratio. Although, in every starting month the average annual alpha is positive, 
it is the largest in January and April and the lowest in July. When only the last decade is studied 
the average annual alphas are smaller but still remain positive. 
 
Zero portfolio risk-adjusted measures for alternative starting dates 
 
The Sharpe ratios for Zero portfolio alternative starting dates are presented in Appendix C.3. As 
with Top 25 the results for Sharpe ratios are consistent with the pattern in raw returns. For each 
of the starting months Sharpe ratios are on average negative or only slightly positive. In the last 
decade the average annual Sharpe ratios are clearly negative for each of the starting dates. Thus it 
can be stated that the poor performance of Zero portfolio is not only due to the selection of the 
starting date. As with the Sharpe ratios the beta values are also consistently over 1.0. The highest 
value of average annual beta is in January and lowest in April. The average annual beta from 
1998 to 2008 is 1.21 which implies that the betas have increased the past ten years compared to 
the full 21-year period. When the return for Zero portfolio is adjusted with Treynor measure the 
average annual returns are positive for each of the alternative starting dates. Nevertheless, the 
adjusted returns remain below market portfolio return. And average annual Treynor adjusted 
returns are significantly negative for the 1998-2008 period. Jensen’s alpha measure indicates that 
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Zero portfolio was unable to achieve any excess return that of predicted by the SML. The alphas 
are clearly negative for every single alternative starting date and are even more if only last decade 
is examined. 
 
Repo portfolio risk-adjusted measures for alternative starting dates 
 
As aforementioned in the beginning the values and results for Repo portfolio are greatly sensitive 
and do not provide grounds for proper analysis and conclusions. There is a positive bias in the 
July and the October initiation dates since years 1989, 1990 and 1991 are excluded since there 
were no companies to be included into the Repo portfolio. Some observations can be made which 
are presented in the Appendix C.4. The Sharpe ratios for the Repo portfolio exhibit the pattern as 
the Top 25 and Zero portfolio, as the Sharpe ratios have decreased from the first decade. The beta 
values on the other hand does not seem to follow any fixed pattern and fluctuates around unity in 
the full and in the both subperiods. Treynor measures also vary greatly since the beta values, used 
in the denominator, in some years were close to zero. The alpha values vary less and appears to 
be more positive in the latter decade. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
I studied companies in 16 European countries from 1988 to 2008. In constructed a Euro 750 
index, which comprised of 750 largest companies in each year measured by their market 
capitalization. From the Euro 750 I formed Top 25, Zero and Repo portfolios. Between these four 
portfolios I conducted a study that aimed to discover the relationship between different payout 
strategies to portfolio returns. I also studied the performance in the longer horizons and the 
performance in bull and bear market. 
 
The high dividend yield portfolio earns higher returns than market portfolio in the full time 
period but this is mainly due to excellent performance in the first decade. In the second decade 
high dividend portfolio is able to outperform the market portfolio but the difference margin is 
diminished. On the other hand the volatility has become lower than in the market portfolio in the 
latter decade as well as the betas are consistently lower in the latter decade compared to the first 
one. In addition, as the beta value for the high dividend yield portfolio is much lower, it can be 
concluded that return characteristics have eroded but the defensive characteristics have improved. 
As in Filbeck and Visscher (1997) and Brzeszczynski et al. (2008) these results are valid also 
after adjusted for the risk. Furthermore, the results are in line with the previous studies as the 
performance of the high dividend yield strategy enchases as the investing period prolongs. 
Especially in the 10 and 21-year periods the high dividend yield outperforms the market 
portfolio. The longer investing period results are robust to the risk-adjustment measures.  
 
The zero dividend strategy is inferior almost in every aspect. It is riskier and earns less than 
market portfolio when compared either with raw compound or risk-adjusted returns. In the longer 
investing periods the zero dividend strategy performs worse than market portfolio except for the 
longest 21-year period. But this finding might be a mere result of the data selection.  
 
The repurchase yield strategy is inferior even to zero dividend strategy both in raw compound 
and risk-adjusted measures. This might derive also from lack of data. Noteworthy is that 
combining repurchase and dividend yields produce the best performance in returns but at the cost 
of the defensive characteristics as the beta and volatility rise. In the longer investing periods the 
repurchase yield portfolio does not perform any better and it does not have enough data to 
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include all the periods. Combining the repurchase and dividend yields improves the performance 
in the 3-year periods but the stand-alone high dividend yield strategy is the best in the longest 
periods. 
 
The study of the performance in the portfolios in bull and bear market is sensitive to the length of 
defining bull and bear market periods. Moreover, the results can be considered to be more 
reliable in the latter decade due to development of the European markets. The high dividend yield 
strategy performs the best in bear market and has the lowest beta except for the longest definition 
of the bull and bear market. Results in the bull market are not that coherent. Each of the other 
portfolios except high dividend yield strategy dominated one of the five-year bull market period 
in the latter decade. The Zero portfolio fails to consistently beat the market portfolio but it has 
higher than one beta on average both in bull and in bear market periods in each of the definitions. 
 
In conclusion, this study shows that the European stock market has changed and developed. 
Alongside with this have changed the different payout related investing strategies. The high 
dividend yield strategy is now more defensive but does not earn great excess returns to market 
portfolio. Moreover, the zero dividend strategy is riskier but does not act as complement for the 
aforementioned strategy neither in bull markets. 
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Appendix A 
 
Appendix A.1.  Raw compound returns of different number of constituents in high dividend yield portfolios and the 
market Portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st of December 2008 
Year Euro 750
25 
constituents
50 
constituents
75 
constituents
25 
constituents
50 
constituents
75 
constituents
1988 34.2 % 51.4 % 38.0 % 37.2 % -2.16* -2.47* -0.64  
1989 9.2 % 9.5 % 3.7 % 7.3 % 0.02  0.40  0.23  
1990 -14.7 % -10.9 % -10.7 % -11.1 % -0.77  0.56  -0.92  
1991 12.2 % -8.6 % -2.0 % -0.6 % 1.53* 1.96* 1.46*
1992 16.3 % 24.4 % 27.9 % 32.5 % -0.89  -0.13  -1.73*
1993 37.2 % 110.9 % 77.4 % 69.9 % -3.39* -1.48* -3.34*
1994 -17.0 % -23.0 % -22.2 % -19.4 % 0.85  0.86  0.88  
1995 15.6 % 10.5 % 12.3 % 16.7 % 0.38  1.63* -0.20  
1996 32.3 % 42.2 % 37.5 % 33.9 % -1.06  -1.65* 1.22  
1997 36.0 % 22.0 % 28.8 % 33.6 % 0.88  -0.96  0.49  
1998 -2.3 % -27.7 % -21.1 % -12.9 % 1.47* 1.45* 0.66  
1999 37.1 % 14.1 % 4.5 % 3.7 % 1.26  -0.11  1.40*
2000 3.9 % 41.6 % 40.6 % 30.1 % -2.81* -2.29* -1.87*
2001 -7.8 % 9.1 % 4.2 % 8.9 % -1.36* -0.81  -1.60*
2002 -43.2 % -34.2 % -38.3 % -36.5 % -1.61* -1.30  -1.76*
2003 26.7 % 12.4 % 51.4 % 42.9 % 1.12  -1.35  -0.50  
2004 9.2 % 11.0 % 12.5 % 13.1 % -0.23  0.32  -1.69*
2005 41.0 % 48.6 % 37.7 % 39.2 % -0.84  -1,00  0.13  
2006 3.8 % -8.8 % -7.4 % -6.0 % 1.06  -0.55  1.34  
2007 -21.9 % -23.6 % -24.3 % -26.9 % 0.28  0.57  1.53*
2008 -25.6 % -21.7 % -29.7 % -27.3 % -0.56  2.60* 0.06  
Average 8.7 % 11.9 % 10.5 % 10.9 %
Average 1988 - 1998 16.1 % 22.8 % 19.1 % 20.0 %
Average 1998 - 2008 1.9 % 1.9 % 2.7 % 2.6 %
Annulized 5.9 % 7.4 % 6.6 % 7.5 %
Volatility 1988 - 1998 - 0.2 % 0.5 % 0.1 %
Volatility 1998 - 2008 - -0.5 % -0.3 % -0.4 %
Top 25 student's t-testTop 25 portfolios
Raw returns for each portfolio is calculated from the monthly realized returns and it shows the return in one year when
$1,000 was invested in each of the securities in the portfolio in the beginning of the year. The standard deviation
differences shows the excess standard deviation to the Euro 750 standard deviation. Student's t-test was calculated as
shown in Equation 1. * Statistically significant result at 10% level.
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Appendix A.2.  Sharpe index of the Euro 750 and different number of 
constituents in Top 25 portfolio 1st April - 1st December 
Year Euro 750
25 
constituents
50 
constituents
75 
constituents
1988 1.28 1.88 1.39 1.44
1989 0.14 0.16 -0.13 0.05
1990 -0.76 -0.65 -0.67 -0.68
1991 0.40 -0.34 -0.12 -0.08
1992 0.55 0.69 0.73 0.83
1993 1.99 3.22 3.03 3.13
1994 -1.72 -2.04 -2.07 -1.78
1995 0.74 0.34 0.51 0.86
1996 1.56 1.69 1.78 1.77
1997 1.56 1.14 1.66 1.67
1998 -0.11 -1.54 -1.32 -0.91
1999 1.65 0.56 0.07 0.03
2000 -0.11 2.76 3.12 2.26
2001 -0.35 0.43 0.15 0.38
2002 -2.34 -1.84 -1.98 -2.00
2003 1.26 0.71 2.11 1.92
2004 0.72 0.87 1.14 1.14
2005 2.03 2.40 1.96 2.04
2006 -0.01 -0.90 -0.99 -0.86
2007 -1.85 -1.79 -1.95 -2.23
2008 -1.40 -1.00 -1.40 -1.28
Average full period 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.37
Average 1988 - 1998 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.72
Average 1998 - 2008 -0.05 0.06 0.08 0.04
Top 25 Portfolios
The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return per unit of risk in the
portfolio. It characterizes how well the return of a portfolio compensates for the
taken risk. It is calculated from the monthly excess return and adjusted for a one
year.
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Appendix A.3. Treynor measure and beta values of different number of constituents in high dividend yield 
portfolios  and Market Portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st 
December2008
Year Euro 750
25 
constituents
50 
constituents
75 
constituents
25 
constituents
50 
constituents
75 
constituents
1988 27.2 % 49.3 % 33.2 % 34.7 % 0.90 0.93 0.87
1989 1.2 % 2.2 % -4.6 % -0.8 % 0.65 0.94 0.87
1990 -22.0 % -21.7 % -22.4 % -22.7 % 0.84 0.80 0.81
1991 7.1 % -11.6 % -6.1 % -5.1 % 1.18 1.17 1.11
1992 12.9 % 18.8 % 20.2 % 24.1 % 1.12 1.21 1.21
1993 34.2 % 88.9 % 72.4 % 70.8 % 1.21 1.03 0.94
1994 -21.6 % -33.1 % -29.5 % -25.2 % 0.83 0.91 0.95
1995 10.2 % 4.3 % 7.5 % 14.2 % 1.19 0.92 0.80
1996 27.2 % 36.0 % 39.2 % 37.6 % 1.03 0.83 0.77
1997 30.9 % 34.6 % 41.6 % 40.3 % 0.49 0.57 0.71
1998 -7.0 % -67.0 % -51.8 % -34.9 % 0.48 0.50 0.50
1999 32.3 % 15.3 % -0.5 % -1.6 % 0.60 0.65 0.70
2000 -1.9 % 82.0 % 80.9 % 63.8 % 0.44 0.43 0.38
2001 -10.8 % 10.7 % 1.7 % 8.1 % 0.57 0.72 0.73
2002 -44.8 % -44.3 % -45.5 % -46.1 % 0.81 0.88 0.83
2003 25.7 % 17.3 % 57.8 % 48.8 % 0.66 0.87 0.86
2004 7.6 % 13.3 % 15.3 % 15.1 % 0.71 0.72 0.77
2005 37.6 % 54.3 % 41.8 % 42.3 % 0.83 0.82 0.85
2006 -1.0 % -22.1 % -20.9 % -13.5 % 0.62 0.58 0.80
2007 -26.0 % -30.0 % -32.3 % -34.9 % 0.92 0.88 0.89
2008 -26.7 % -25.5 % -32.0 % -29.8 % 0.90 0.96 0.95
Average full period 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.81 0.83 0.82
Average 1988 - 1998 0.11 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.94 0.93 0.90
Average 1998 - 2008 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.69 0.73 0.75
Top 25 beta valueTop 25 Treynor measure
Treynor measure adjusts the return when the portfolio holds the same systematic risk as market fully-diversified market
portfolio. It relates the excess returns in a year to the beta coefficient of the portfolio. Jensen’s alpha determines the
excess return of the portfolio of securities over the portfolio's theoretical expected return. Returns are calculated on yearly
basis. Beta coefficient is calculated as portfolio returns’ relation to the market portfolio.
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Appendix A.4. Jensen’s alpha measure for the Euro 750 and different 
number of constituents in Top 25 portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st December 
2008 
Year 25 constituents 50 constituents 75 constituents
1988 19.9 % 5.6 % 6.5 %
1989 0.7 % -5.5 % -1.7 %
1990 0.2 % -0.3 % -0.5 %
1991 -22.1 % -15.5 % -13.6 %
1992 6.6 % 8.9 % 13.5 %
1993 66.4 % 39.3 % 34.6 %
1994 -9.6 % -7.2 % -3.5 %
1995 -7.0 % -2.5 % 3.2 %
1996 9.0 % 9.9 % 7.9 %
1997 1.8 % 6.1 % 6.7 %
1998 -29.0 % -22.3 % -14.0 %
1999 -10.2 % -21.4 % -23.7 %
2000 36.6 % 35.6 % 25.0 %
2001 12.2 % 9.0 % 13.7 %
2002 0.4 % -0.6 % -1.1 %
2003 -5.5 % 28.0 % 19.9 %
2004 4.0 % 5.5 % 5.7 %
2005 13.9 % 3.4 % 3.9 %
2006 -13.0 % -11.6 % -10.0 %
2007 -3.7 % -5.6 % -7.9 %
2008 1.1 % -5.2 % -3.0 %
Average 3.46 % 2.56 % 2.94 %
Average 1988 - 1998 6.58 % 3.89 % 5.31 %
Average 1998 - 2008 0.61 % 1.35 % 0.78 %
Top 25 alpha value
Jensen’s alpha determines the excess return of the portfolio of securities
over the portfolio's theoretical expected return. 
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Appendix B 
 
Appendix B.1. Raw compound returns of alternative definitions of high dividend yield portfolios and the market 
Portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st of December 2008 
Year Euro 750
25 
constituents
20 % 
dividend 
yield
unmodified 
dividend 
yield
25 
constituents
20 % 
dividend 
yield
unmodified 
dividend 
yield
1988 34.2 % 51.4 % 42.2 % 38.9 % -2.16* -1.54* -0.91  
1989 9.2 % 9.5 % 8.2 % 9.1 % 0.02  0.16  0.06  
1990 -14.7 % -10.9 % -10.5 % -14.5 % -0.77  -0.52  0.04  
1991 12.2 % -8.6 % -5.2 % -7.4 % 1.53* 1.89* 2.75*
1992 16.3 % 24.4 % 32.5 % 29.7 % -0.89  -1.44* -0.95  
1993 37.2 % 110.9 % 56.8 % 50.1 % -3.39* -2.90* -2.17*
1994 -17.0 % -23.0 % -20.1 % -21.2 % 0.85  0.83  1.46*
1995 15.6 % 10.5 % 14.0 % 14.2 % 0.38  0.30  0.13  
1996 32.3 % 42.2 % 31.0 % 25.9 % -1.06  0.23  0.94  
1997 36.0 % 22.0 % 26.2 % 21.7 % 0.88  0.88  1.19  
1998 -2.3 % -27.7 % -15.4 % -19.5 % 1.47* 0.94  1.15  
1999 37.1 % 14.1 % 8.1 % 5.4 % 1.26  1.66* 2,00*
2000 3.9 % 41.6 % 37.2 % 39.0 % -2.81* -2.16* -2.41*
2001 -7.8 % 9.1 % 4.0 % -0.2 % -1.36* -1.20  -0.87  
2002 -43.2 % -34.2 % -36.7 % -36.7 % -1.61* -1.31  -1.59*
2003 26.7 % 12.4 % 19.7 % 51.2 % 1.12  0.75  -1.35  
2004 9.2 % 11.0 % 18.3 % 20.6 % -0.23  -1.37* -1.83*
2005 41.0 % 48.6 % 38.7 % 36.7 % -0.84  0.32  0.68  
2006 3.8 % -8.8 % -2.9 % 0.9 % 1.06  0.86  0.51  
2007 -21.9 % -23.6 % -24.7 % -28.4 % 0.28  0.60  1.41*
2008 -25.6 % -21.7 % -25.1 % -35.8 % -0.56  -0.12  1.46*
Average 8.7 % 11.9 % 9.4 % 8.6 %
Average 1988 - 1998 16.1 % 22.8 % 17.5 % 14.6 %
Average 1998 - 2008 1.9 % 1.9 % 1.9 % 3.0 %
Annulized 5.9 % 7.4 % 6.4 % 5.0 %
Volatility 1988 - 1998 - 0.2 % 0.1 % 0.4 %
Volatility 1998 - 2008 - -0.5 % -0.5 % 0.0 %
Top 25 Portfolios Top 25 student's t-test
Raw returns for each portfolio is calculated from the monthly realized returns and it shows the return in one year when
$1 was invested in each of the securities in the portfolio in the beginning of the year. The standard deviation
differences shows the excess standard deviation to the Euro 750 standard deviation. Student's t-test was calculated as
shown in Equation 1. * Statistically significant result at 10% level.
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Appendix B.2. Sharpe index of alternative definitions for high dividend yield 
portfolios and Market Portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st December 2008 
Year Euro 750
25 
constituents
20 % 
dividend yield
unmodified 
dividend yield
1988 1.28 1.88 1.66 1.42
1989 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.13
1990 -0.76 -0.65 -0.78 -0.81
1991 0.40 -0.34 -0.29 -0.46
1992 0.55 0.69 0.85 0.73
1993 1.99 3.22 3.02 2.70
1994 -1.72 -2.04 -1.71 -2.03
1995 0.74 0.34 0.64 0.55
1996 1.56 1.69 1.49 1.24
1997 1.56 1.14 1.36 1.06
1998 -0.11 -1.54 -1.20 -1.39
1999 1.65 0.56 0.25 0.11
2000 -0.11 2.76 2.46 2.56
2001 -0.35 0.43 0.14 -0.05
2002 -2.34 -1.84 -2.00 -1.92
2003 1.26 0.71 1.08 1.48
2004 0.72 0.87 1.59 1.75
2005 2.03 2.40 2.00 1.81
2006 -0.01 -0.90 -0.59 -0.28
2007 -1.85 -1.79 -1.98 -2.28
2008 -1.40 -1.00 -1.26 -1.61
Average 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.22
Average 1988 - 1998 0.58 0.61 0.63 0.45
Average 1998 - 2008 -0.05 0.06 0.05 0.02
Top 25 Portfolios
The Sharpe ratio is a measure of the excess return per unit of risk in the portfolio. It
characterizes how well the return of a portfolio compensates for the taken risk. It is
calculated from the monthly excess return and adjusted for a one year.
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Appendix B.3. Treynor  measure and beta values of alternative definitions for high dividend yield portfolios and 
Market Portfolio 1st April 1988 - 1st December 2008 
Year Euro 750
25 
constituents
20 % 
dividend 
yield
unmodified 
dividend 
yield
25 
constituents
20 % 
dividend 
yield
unmodified 
dividend 
yield
1988 27.2 % 49.3 % 41.0 % 34.3 % 0.90 0.86 0.93
1989 1.2 % 2.2 % 0.2 % 1.4 % 0.65 0.84 0.77
1990 -22.0 % -21.7 % -24.9 % -25.6 % 0.84 0.71 0.85
1991 7.1 % -11.6 % -9.9 % -13.7 % 1.18 1.04 0.92
1992 12.9 % 18.8 % 25.2 % 19.1 % 1.12 1.16 1.38
1993 34.2 % 88.9 % 64.2 % 55.6 % 1.21 0.84 0.85
1994 -21.6 % -33.1 % -24.1 % -28.0 % 0.83 1.02 0.92
1995 10.2 % 4.3 % 10.0 % 7.9 % 1.19 0.86 1.11
1996 27.2 % 36.0 % 29.3 % 24.4 % 1.03 0.89 0.86
1997 30.9 % 34.6 % 33.3 % 25.8 % 0.49 0.63 0.65
1998 -7.0 % -67.0 % -46.4 % -55.3 % 0.48 0.43 0.44
1999 32.3 % 15.3 % 4.7 % 1.0 % 0.60 0.72 0.62
2000 -1.9 % 82.0 % 112.2 % 93.1 % 0.44 0.28 0.36
2001 -10.8 % 10.7 % 1.4 % -4.2 % 0.57 0.68 0.76
2002 -44.8 % -44.3 % -46.6 % -44.0 % 0.81 0.82 0.87
2003 25.7 % 17.3 % 25.8 % 38.7 % 0.66 0.73 1.30
2004 7.6 % 13.3 % 23.8 % 25.8 % 0.71 0.70 0.74
2005 37.6 % 54.3 % 42.8 % 37.3 % 0.83 0.82 0.89
2006 -1.0 % -22.1 % -11.7 % -5.6 % 0.62 0.66 0.70
2007 -26.0 % -30.0 % -32.1 % -36.1 % 0.92 0.90 0.90
2008 -26.7 % -25.5 % -29.9 % -34.4 % 0.90 0.87 1.07
Average 4.4 % 8.2 % 9.0 % 5.6 % 0.81 0.78 0.85
Average 1988 - 1998 10.7 % 16.8 % 14.4 % 10.1 % 0.94 0.88 0.92
Average 1998 - 2008 -1.4 % 0.4 % 4.0 % 1.5 % 0.69 0.69 0.79
Top 25 Treynor measure Top 25 beta value
Treynor measure adjusts the return when the portfolio holds the same systematic risk as market fully-diversified market
portfolio. It relates the excess returns in a year to the beta coefficient of the portfolio. Returns are calculated on yearly
basis.The betas were regressed against the Euro 750 portfolios return.
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Appendix B.4. Jensen’s alpha measure for the alternative definitions of 
Top 25 portfolios 1st April 1988- 1st December 2008 
Year
25 
constituents
20 % dividend 
yield
unmodified 
dividend yield
1988 19.9 % 11.8 % 6.6 %
1989 0.7 % -0.8 % 0.1 %
1990 0.2 % -2.1 % -3.1 %
1991 -22.1 % -17.6 % -19.1 %
1992 6.6 % 14.3 % 8.6 %
1993 66.4 % 25.2 % 18.1 %
1994 -9.6 % -2.6 % -5.9 %
1995 -7.0 % -0.2 % -2.5 %
1996 9.0 % 1.8 % -2.4 %
1997 1.8 % 1.5 % -3.3 %
1998 -29.0 % -17.1 % -21.1 %
1999 -10.2 % -19.8 % -19.3 %
2000 36.6 % 31.9 % 33.9 %
2001 12.2 % 8.4 % 5.0 %
2002 0.4 % -1.5 % 0.7 %
2003 -5.5 % 0.1 % 16.9 %
2004 4.0 % 11.4 % 13.4 %
2005 13.9 % 4.3 % -0.3 %
2006 -13.0 % -7.0 % -3.2 %
2007 -3.7 % -5.5 % -9.1 %
2008 1.1 % -2.8 % -8.3 %
Average 3.5 % 1.6 % 0.3 %
Average 1988 - 1998 6.6 % 3.1 % -0.3 %
Average 1998 - 2008 0.6 % 0.2 % 0.8 %
Top 25 Alpha value
Jensen’s alpha determines the excess return of the portfolio of
securities over the portfolio's theoretical expected return. 
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Appendix D 
 
Figure 3. Comparison of payout vehicles in Euro 750 from 1988 to 2007 in Euros 
Figure 3 depicts the paid out dividends, announced repurchases and completed repurchases by the Euro 750 companies from
1988 to 2007. The US dollar amount were converted to Euros using yearly average spot rate. For before 1999 years a
computational EURUSD rate was used.
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